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Social media sites, while facilitating the collection and sharing of personal information online, 
have had negative consequences for personal privacy. Policy makers have yet to define which 
aspects of online communication on social media sites, if any, can be legally considered 
“private”, leaving many users with a false sense of security online. This study compares the 
offline behavior of 381 survey respondents to their behavior on social media sites in order to 
determine if offline privacy law can be applied to cyberspace. An analysis of these responses 
finds that: 1) social media users have negotiated a privacy boundary online; 2) online privacy 
protection is similar to the privacy protection used offline; 3) older generational cohorts are less 
likely than the Net Generation to closely guard their privacy online.  Because generational 
cohorts do vary in their online behavior, it appears that privacy boundaries on social media sites 
have not been firmly settled. However, privacy standards online are beginning to take shape. 
This study has important implications for privacy law. By empirically determining whether or 
not social media users have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” on social media sites, this 
research may contribute to the development of a new legal standard that protects privacy both 
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“Can the everyday Facebook enthusiast be expected to protect privacy on an inherently social 
site?” -Ben Rothke, an IT manager for an information security company (Rothke, 2010).  
 
  
The development of interpersonal communication technology has bridged the physical 
distance between individuals in modern society by facilitating the ability to gather and share 
information.  However, these new technologies also come at a potential cost to personal privacy 
(Agre & Rotenberg, 1997; Moore, Jr., 1984; Caloyannides, 2003; Ware, 1986; Sylvester & 
Wolinsky, 1992). The contemporary legal concept of personal privacy, defined as the right to 
control the access and use of personal information, was established in the late 19
th
 century by 
Warren and Brandeis (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Concerned that “modern” media technologies 
such as instant photographs and tabloid newspapers were intruding into the private lives of 
American citizens, Warren and Brandeis argued that individuals have a “right to be let alone” 
(Warren & Brandeis, 1890, para. 1). However, is this right to personal privacy, defended by 
Warren and Brandeis, “truly a legally protected right or just a philosophical statement of wish?” 
(Caloyannides, 2003, p. 100). 
The Fourth Amendment, which protects the right of citizens against privacy intrusions by 
the government, has served as the constitutional safeguard of personal privacy. The Supreme 
Court has defined and redefined the boundary between public and private, reconciling the 
capabilities of new technologies with a constitutional right developed before these technologies 
were even imaginable. In general, the Supreme Court has expanded the Fourth Amendment to 
protect against the greater risk of privacy invasion made possible by new technologies. However 




physical space of the home. The 1928 Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, allowed law enforcement to wire-tap phone conversations as long as they did not physically 
enter the suspect’s house. The Supreme Court deviated from this trespass-based approach in a 
later case, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which involved law enforcement 
recording conversations in a public telephone booth. Due to the development of technologies that 
allow a person to communicate privately while outside the home, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Katz that regardless of physical location, a person with a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is 
protected from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 389 U.S. 360 
(1967). In this case, the creation of a "reasonable expectation of privacy,” even when in a public 
space, involved shutting the door to a phone booth.    
The Internet, because access is widely available and increasingly inexpensive, has 
facilitated the collection and sharing of personal information on an even greater scale 
(Calyionnides, 2003).  Technological innovations in cyberspace, such as the development of 
social media including Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter, are communication platforms used by 
tens of millions of people to share personal information online. As Mark Zuckerburg, founder of 
Facebook explained at a 2010 interview at the TechCrunch awards, “In the last 5 or 6 years, 
blogging has taken off in a huge way and all these different services that have people sharing all 
this information. People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and 
different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm is just something that's 
evolved over time” (Popkin, 2010, para. 9).  
However, while users reveal more and more information on these social media sites, 
many still consider their personal content to be private. Even though these individuals find 




expectations of privacy (Ware, 1986). Since a privacy standard has not yet been legally defined 
online, the role of negotiating the boundary between public and private space on social media has 
been thrust upon social media users themselves. While many users apply the privacy controls 
developed by these sites, others self-monitor their content by deleting or refraining from posting 
comments and photos that may be considered inappropriate in order to manage their image 
online. Do these behaviors represent an expectation of privacy on social media?  Without 
confirmation from policy makers or the courts, the answer to this question is, at present, 
anyone’s guess. 
The Internet poses a significant challenge to legal doctrine regarding the definition of the 
private sphere and protections against privacy intrusions afforded to the American public under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States (Semitsu, 2011). The Katz expectation-of-privacy 
test “rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and 
stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations,” writes Justice 
Alito in the recent Supreme Court decision United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ____ (2012), (p. 
10). This case concluded that police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they attached 
a physical GPS device to the defendant’s car, 565 U. S. ____ (2012). Justice Alito argues that 
dramatic changes in technology can significantly alter popular privacy expectations. During 
times of rapid technological development, some have argued that legislation is needed for 
initiating solutions to privacy concerns since legislative bodies are not constrained to court 
precedent or the text of the constitution and are more directly accountable to public preferences 
(Kerr, 2004; 565 U. S. ____ (2012)). 
Since private communication on social media sites has yet to be defined, legal scholars 




apply offline privacy definitions and laws to these online sites (Hodge, 2006; Semitsu, 2011). 
However, social media interactions differ from face-to-face friendships in several ways. Social 
media users interact with a much larger group than most people interact with offline. For 
example, the average Facebook user has 130 friends (“Statistics”, 2011) and the average Twitter 
user has 126 followers (Arthur, 2009). Social media sites also allow users to do the impossible: 
gather these friends into the same “room” and share any aspect of their private life, sometimes 
several times per day. Semitsu (2011) argues that this difference between interactions offline and 
on social media does not automatically disqualify an expectation of privacy. Thus, the question 
becomes, do social media users act in a way that guarantees an expectation of privacy?  This is 
best answered by comparing offline behaviors that have been decided by the Supreme Court in 
Katz to ensure an expectation of privacy with privacy protection on social media sites. And, 
more generally, asking the American public to reflect on how much privacy is expected on these 
sites.  
Literature Review 
An Overview of Facebook 
Facebook was chosen as the focus of this study for a variety of reasons. First, Facebook is 
the world’s largest social media site with over 800 million users worldwide- 1 in every 13 people 
on earth use Facebook. (“Facebook”, 2011; “Facebook Statistics”, 2011).  Also, while 48% of its 
users are 18 to 34 year olds, the 35 and older cohort, currently 30% of the user base is growing 
steadily, demonstrating that Facebook is not solely limited to a specific group of people. Lastly, 
Facebook has a diverse array of opportunities for sharing private information with both text and 
photos, and similar privacy controls to other social media sites like Myspace, Twitter, Facebook 




implications for current social privacy norms upon which developments in online privacy law 
will be based.  
Facebook, launched in February 2004, allows a registered user to create a personal profile 
and to add other users as friends. Originally the site was limited to Harvard students, but it 
quickly extended access to students at all Ivy League schools, then to students at all universities, 
and eventually to anyone over the age of 13. Facebook invites users to disclose private 
information which appears on their profile and can be shared with their Facebook friends. Users 
are asked to include their favorite books, movies, music, and television shows, interests, 
activities, employment history, educational history, email address, phone number, political 
views, and sexual orientation.  Users share content by exchanging “wall posts” which are posted 
onto a friend’s profile, sending “Facebook messages” which, like an email, are sent to a friend’s 
Facebook inbox, creating “statuses” which are broadcasted to a users’ friends, uploading photos, 
and “tagging” others in photos which allows that photo to be posted to a friend’s wall. Facebook 
users can interact with others’ posts and uploads by “liking” them or commenting on them. Users 
then receive notifications when their content is liked or commented on. Users can also use their 
“News Feed” to track their friends’ posts and uploads.   
Facebook has played an important role in developing and maintaining relationships with 
friends and may even affect social capital more generally. The site allows users to remain in 
contact with a large social network, including friends who have moved away, or to encourage 
relationships with recent acquaintances (Debatin et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2007). This 
facilitation of friendship networks is correlated with the maintenance and creation of social 
capital (Ellison et al., 2007). Facebook users are also able to “participate in intimate yet 




friends’ pictures” (Debatin et al., 2009, p. 19). In general, the benefits Facebook provides seem 
to override the potential loss of privacy, and this seems to hold even among those who have 
experienced privacy invasion (Debatin et al., 2009).  
Privacy Risks on Social Media: The Facebook Case 
While Facebook has obvious social benefits, Facebook users do not always have control 
over or even knowledge about the many individuals with access to their personal information. 
Facebook users therefore must “continually negotiate and manage the tension between perceived 
privacy risks and expected benefits” (Debatin et al., 2009, p. 87). Privacy breaches may bring 
unintended negative consequences. For example, college students have faced scrutiny from 
potential employers, school officials, and law enforcement based on the material they post on 
social media (Smith and Kidder, 2010; Stone, 2006; Kornblum and Marklein, 2006; Kornblum & 
Marklein, 2006; “The Fuzz”, 2006; Welsh 2008). Facebook content which these groups find 
inappropriate, or even illegal, can result in serious consequences.  
 Employers have admitted using Facebook for recruiting and assessing applicants (Smith 
and Kidder, 2010; Zeidner, 2007). To gain access to a user’s private information, employers can 
“friend” the job applicant, ask current employees who may know the applicant to gain access to 
the applicant’s page, or ask the applicant in an interview to surrender his or her Facebook login 
password (Brandenberg, 2008; Duncan, 2012). A study by Reppler, an online image 
management company, which surveyed 300 different “hiring types”, found that 91% are doing 
social media screens of job applicants and that 69% had rejected at least one candidate based on 
that process (Hill, 2011).  Anecdotes include a New York-based nonprofit organization rejecting 
an applicant because of “extensive romantic exploits” cited on his Facebook page or a company 




candidate holding a bottle of vodka (Smith and Kidder, 2010; Stone, 2006). The Reppler study 
also asked these employers why they had rejected applicants. They found the following reasons 
for rejection: 11% for posting inappropriate photos, 11% for posting inappropriate comments, 
9% for posting content about drinking, 10% for posting content about drug use, 11% for posting 
negative comments about a previous employer, and 10% for posting discriminatory comments 
(Hill, 2011).  These examples illustrate the significant consequences that social networking can 
have on an individual’s professional life.  
 Universities are also adapting Code of Conduct policies that cover social media use. 
Universities such as the University of Wisconsin Madison, the University of Minnesota, Penn 
State, the University of Colorado Boulder, and Ohio State University all maintain disciplinary 
policies for behavior on social media which is considered to be “dangerous and damaging to the 
reputation of the school” (Beckstrom, 2008-2009, p. 273). Students at several schools have been 
disciplined for making negative comments about professors or for posting inappropriate photos 
(Kornblum and Marklein, 2006). Even though most schools claim that they do not actively 
monitor students’ conduct on social media, if a school becomes aware of behavior that violates 
its policies, the school administration often takes action (Lipka, 2008).  
 Police officers also may receive training about Facebook as a way to investigate and 
reduce crime (Kornblum & Marklein, 2006). On college campuses, police officers have used 
Facebook to investigate harassment complaints, to identify offenders who run off, or to shut 
down parties with underage drinking (Kornblum & Marklein, 2006; “The Fuzz”, 2006; Welsh 
2008). Facebook users other than college students have also encountered legal trouble because of 
their Facebook content. For instance, Anthony Wilson of Detroit was indicted on bank robbery 




video (Snell, 2011). Police officers access Facebook profiles by viewing information set to 
public settings, creating fake profiles, voluntary disclosure from a third party such as an Internet 
service provider (ISP) or Facebook itself.  In a very recent development, the FBI released an 
advertisement in January 2012, looking for companies with the capability to build a data-mining 
application for social media sites, including Facebook. A statement later released by the FBI said 
that the intent of the program is to view publically available, non-private, information and to 
focus not on specific people or groups, but on key terms relating to terrorism and illegal 
activities (Giles, 2012).  Although this data-mining program is not yet operable, it is another 
important example of how online privacy concerns and law-enforcement are increasingly coming 
into contact. 
Facebook Privacy Policy and Controls 
In recent years, Facebook users have criticized Facebook’s privacy policies for being 
“user-unfriendly” (Gabbert, 2011, para 4).  For example, its previous policy, which became 
effective in December 2010, was much more lenient than current privacy policies about what 
user information it was allowed to share: 
We may share your information in response to a legal request (like a search warrant, 
court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith belief that the law requires us to do so. 
This may include responding to legal requests from jurisdictions outside of the United 
States where we have a good faith belief that the response is required by law in that 
jurisdiction, affects users in that jurisdiction, and is consistent with internationally 
recognized standards. We may also share information when we have a good faith belief it 
is necessary to: detect, prevent and address fraud and other illegal activity; to protect 
ourselves and you from violations of our Statement of Rights and Responsibilities; and to 
prevent death or imminent bodily harm. 
 
In other words, Facebook could voluntarily disclose user information if staff had “a good faith 




 Facebook has since updated its policy to accommodate its users’ expectations of privacy. 
Facebook’s most recent revision on September 23, 2011 gives users greater control over their 
information in response to this criticism: 
While you are allowing us to use the information we receive about you, you always own all 
of your information. Your trust is important to us, which is why we don't share information 
we receive about you with others unless we have: 
 received your permission; 
 given you notice, such as by telling you about it in this policy; or 
 removed your name or any other personally identifying information from it. 
Facebook has also taken a hard-line stance on protecting its users against privacy 
invasions. Facebook recently warned employers not to ask job applicants for their Facebook 
passwords, stating that this type of request violates both a user’s privacy and Facebook’s terms 
of service (Duncan, 2012).  “We’ll take action to protect the privacy and security of our users, 
whether by engaging policymakers or, where appropriate, by initiating legal action,” wrote 
Facebook’s chief privacy officer Erin Egan. “It is important that everyone on Facebook 
understands they have a right to keep their password to themselves, and we will do our best to 
protect that right” (Duncan, 2012, para 4).  
Facebook also updated its privacy controls on August 23, 2011 in response to user 
suggestions. Facebook privacy controls allow users customize privacy for each item they share 
on their profile. Next to each item is a dropdown “audience selector” menu which gives the user 
the opportunity to choose from each of the following audiences: 
 Public (Visible to everyone- maximum audience) 
Friends (Includes Facebook friends and friends of anyone tagged)  
Custom (Includes specific groups of people you’ve specified to include or exclude) 
 
New privacy features also give users the opportunity to “screen tagged photos before they appear 




controls, the following information is always public: name, profile picture, gender, username, 
and networks. 
The Development of Privacy Law 
The contemporary concept of a right to privacy was first established in an 1890 Harvard 
Law Review article by Warren and Brandeis (Bratman, 2001-2002). The article was inspired by 
the authors’ distaste of journalists’ intrusion into the private lives of politicians and celebrities. 
Warren and Brandeis argued that new technologies such as “instantaneous photographs and 
newspaper enterprise [had] invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life” by 
allowing the public dissemination of information related to a person’s private life (1890, para. 4). 
They argued that citizens had the “right to be let alone” which was protected under existing 
common law (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, para. 1). This right extended beyond a person’s right to 
physical property to include his “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions” (para. 9). In other words, 
Warren and Brandeis believed that “’property’” [had] grown to comprise every form of 
possession- intangible, as well as tangible” (1890, para. 1). However, this definition of privacy 
was not immediately supported.  
In constitutional law, a right to privacy has been based on the Fourth Amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized (U.S. Const. amend. IV). 
 
The Fourth Amendment was originally interpreted to protect a citizen’s right against government 
intrusion of physical property. Over time, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this amendment 
has evolved to incorporate Warren and Brandeis’ broader definition.  
In the Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United States (1928), Justice Taft, writing the 




was not considered a government intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. Taft reasoned that 
“there was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants” and that “evidence was secured 
by the use of the sense of hearing,” 277 U. S. 465, (1928). According to the Taft majority, the 
Fourth Amendment only protects against physical trespass of the home and the seizure of 
tangible property, rather than intangible personal property such as a telephone conversation. 
However, Brandeis, dissenting, argued that the court must “meet modern conditions,” 277 U. S. 
465, (1928). He believed that the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment must be expanded to 
include the capabilities of new technologies which could not have been predicted by the 
Founders when writing the constitution.  
 Following Brandeis’ suggestions, the majority’s strict interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment as a protection against trespass was broadened in Katz v. United States (1967). The 
question at issue here was whether the recording of a telephone conversation in a public 
telephone booth by law enforcement constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice 
Stewart, writing for the majority, argued that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, 
so that an intrusion of privacy is not defined solely as a physical trespass of the home. Stewart 
argued that the Fourth Amendment also protects against intrusion in a public setting if the 
individual takes steps to create a private space. “One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the 
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume 
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world,” writes 
Stewart,389 U.S. 352, (1967). Because the plaintiff, Katz, “shut the door” to the telephone booth, 
he was able to create a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public space. Justice Harlan, 
writing a concurring opinion, further refined the concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 




privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable,’” 389 U.S. 361, (1967). Thus, a reasonable expectation of privacy exists if two 
criteria are met. An individual must exhibit an expectation of privacy such as shutting a 
telephone booth door and society must acknowledge this expectation of privacy as reasonable.  
However, the Katz rule does not protect one aspect of privacy- information revealed to a 
third party. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities,” 425 U.S. 435 (1976). This rule, known as the Third Party Doctrine, 
disqualifies an expectation of privacy for information that has been knowingly revealed to a third 
party (Kerr, 2009). The Third Party Doctrine implies that if information on a social media site is 
shared with a third-party, such as Facebook staff or an Internet service provider, users would 
forfeit privacy rights (Semitsu, 2011). Justice Sotomayor in a recent Supreme Court decision, 
United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ____ (2012), directly questions this aspect of the Katz ruling in 
a concurring opinion: “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” she 
writes (p. 5). Sotomayor argues that this qualification is inappropriate in the digital age in which 
people reveal large amounts of private information to third parties, 565 U. S. ____ (2012). 
The Sixth Court of Appeals in Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (2008) found that 
in some circumstances there is a reasonable expectation of privacy even after information has 
been turned over to a third-party. In this case, the government requested a secret subpoena to 
access Warshak’s personal emails without his knowledge. The court found that the government 
had violated Warshak’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment because Warshak had a 




a third-party Internet service provider (ISP), there is no notice from the ISP that it will access 
email content. Thus, the court ruled, there remains a societal expectation that the email content is 
private. While this court ruling protects privacy online and could be applied to protect privacy on 
Facebook in the future, the Sixth Court of Appeals has limited jurisdiction and the Supreme 
Court could overturn this ruling if desired. However, Justice Sotomayor’s statements hint that the 
Supreme Court may agree that the Third Party Doctrine no longer applies on the Internet.  
The Stored Communications Act (1986), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, included in the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, was a legislative initiative to limit the Third Party Doctrine and 
the ability of third-party ISPs to reveal “information in their possession about their customers 
and subscribers” to the government and non-government entities.  “The SCA was passed to 
bolster the weak Fourth Amendment privacy protections that applied to the Internet,” according 
to legal scholar Orin Kern (Kern, 2004, p. 1234).  
The SCA protects information stored on two types of service providers referred to as 
“electronic communication service” providers (ECS) and “remote computing service” providers 
(RCS): 
(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental 
to the electronic transmission thereof. 
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communications service for the 
purposes of backup protection of such communication.  
 
ECS providers are “prohibited from knowingly divulging the contents of a communication while 
in ‘electronic storage’ by that service” (Sidoti et al., 2010, p. 2). RCS providers are “are 
prohibited from divulging the content of any electronic communication carried or maintained on 
its service solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services, if the 
provider is not authorized to access the communication for other purposes.” (Sidoti et al., 2010, 




When Congress passed the SCA in 1986, the Internet was a nascent technology. 
Electronic communication has since exploded and new online communication technologies, such 
as social media sites, have emerged. However, Congress has not yet modified the SCA to protect 
the private information on these sites. Although Congress has not amended its policies, a recent 
court ruling has expanded the SCA to protect some aspects of Facebook.  
District court Judge Morrow determined that Facebook and Myspace messages were 
subject to the SCA, since webmail and private messaging are “inherently private”  
communications that are “not readily accessible to the general public,” Crispin v. Christian 
Audigier Inc, 717 F. Supp. 2d 991 (2010). Facebook and Myspace wall posts were also 
considered to be protected by the SCA as long as “their access was limited to a few,” Crispin v. 
Christian Audigier Inc, 717 F. Supp. 2d 991 (2010). In other words, wall posts that were hidden 
behind privacy settings and were not available to the general public were also subject to the SCA 
(Sidoti et al., 2010). This is the first example of a judge allowing social media privacy settings to 
determine a privacy boundary online. However, since the case was only brought before a United 
States District Court, Judge Morrow’s ruling has limited jurisdiction. Also, even with the 
protections afforded by the SCA under Judge Morrow’s ruling, the SCA states that a warrant to 
notify the user that his or her electronic communications are being confiscated is only required to 
obtain content that is less than 181 days old. The government does not need a warrant to obtain 
electronic communications that have been in storage for more than 180 days.  
 While the SCA is the most recent piece of legislation passed by policy makers relevant to 
Facebook privacy, the Federal Trade Commission is currently working with Facebook to develop 
a privacy policy reminiscent of the Crispin holding. The F.T.C., on November 29, 2011, closed a 




before it can override their own privacy settings” (Sengupta, 2011, para. 9). The F.T.C. has also 
recently worked with Google and Twitter to establish better privacy practices. It appears that 
both policy makers and courts are beginning to react to the technological innovations online in 
order to make long overdue reforms to the creation and interpretation of legislation relating to 
online privacy and in particular, social media.  
 Legal scholars have recommended reforms that the courts and policy makers should 
implement regarding Facebook privacy (Beckstrom, 2008-2009; Hodge, 2006; Semitsu, 2011). 
Semitsu (2011) compares conversations on Facebook to the telephone booth conversation 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Katz to warrant an expectation of privacy. He finds one 
main difference between the Katz telephone conversation and an equivalent conversation that 
might happen on Facebook today. On Facebook, Katz’s wall post or status would be broadcast to 
all of his Facebook friends. However, Semitsu argues that the “court never suggested that 
additional message recipients instantly defeat the expectation of privacy” (Semitsu, 2011, p. 
369). In fact, Justice Stewart, in Katz, writes that “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected,”  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S., 351 (1967).   
Semitsu then applies the Katz ruling to Facebook in order to suggest how courts today 
should interpret privacy intrusions on social media. He argues that the courts should view 
Facebook as the “twenty-first century equivalent of a phone booth” (Semitsu, 2011, p. 369). An 
individual who sets his Facebook content to private makes the equivalent action of shutting the 
telephone booth door. Conversely, an individual who keeps his content public cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. He adds that Facebook content that is permanently public, 




a glass phone booth” (Semitsu, 2011, p. 370). Semitsu (2011) also argues that policy makers 
should eliminate conflicting interpretations of the SCA by limiting the voluntary disclosure 
doctrine of third parties and adapt the SCA to explicitly protect all content on Facebook, such as 
photo-sharing and event-creating.  
 However, these recommendations are based solely on normative argument.  While 
normative argument is important in developing the legal theory behind court decisions, 
“empirical and descriptive claims as to the current cultural understandings of privacy are very 
important in conceptualizing privacy. A conception of privacy must be responsive to social 
reality since privacy is an aspect of social practices” (Solove, 2002, p. 1142). Similarly, the 
social reality of privacy is deemed important by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in the 
Katz case. An individual must have an expectation of privacy “that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable,’” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 361, (1967). Empirically measuring 
society’s expectation of privacy would greatly strengthen a court’s interpretation or a policy 
maker’s decision in determining the privacy boundary on social media. 
Empirical Research Regarding Facebook Privacy 
Since a definitive legal decision hasn’t been made by policy makers or the courts, the 
privacy boundary on social media sites has so far been determined by user norms and 
experiences. This boundary is asserted each time a social media user “venture[s] too far into 
public space with private details” resulting in negative consequences for the user (Lewis et al., 
2009, p. 96). As news of these negative consequences spreads to other social media users, norms 
begin to develop regarding the extent to which private information is appropriate to share online. 




Benson conducted open interviews with ten Canadian individuals between the ages of 22 
and 25 to compare their netiquette on Facebook to their etiquette offline.  She hypothesized that 
personal information that is considered “offline-inappropriate” may be considered appropriate 
online, since individuals may assume that their online behavior is judged more leniently 
(Benson, 2009). Benson (2009) identified several categories of inappropriate Facebook content, 
including: 1) nudity, 2) excessive drinking, 3) drug use, 4) name-calling, 5) inappropriate photos 
with significant others, 5) racial slurs, and 6) political comments. Contrary to Benson’s 
hypothesis, the respondents considered these behaviors to be inappropriate online as well as 
offline. Benson further stated that appropriate online behaviors consisted of being “polite and 
courteous” and “the posting of embarrassing pictures of others is to be avoided, especially if one 
does not want embarrassing pictures posted of oneself” (Benson, 2009, p. 63). Benson’s (2009) 
respondents endorsed that a traditional sense of etiquette should be maintained in the online 
environment.  However, Benson found that, at times, personal information deemed within 
“netiquette range” on Facebook would be seen as inappropriate by an employer.  Thus, while 
Benson (2009) found that sharing personal information that was considered inappropriate offline 
was similarly considered inappropriate on Facebook, she also found that standards of 
appropriateness on Facebook are slightly more lenient.  
This thesis will re-examine the claim that a traditional sense of offline etiquette is 
maintained online. While Benson’s studied focused on describing the similarities between the 
amount of private information individuals share offline and on Facebook, I will expand the scope 
of her research by using a larger and more diverse sample and comparing the manners in which 
individuals limit access to information about their private life both offline and on Facebook. In 




actions that limit access to this private information. By comparing self-revelation and privacy 
protection on Facebook and offline, I hope to provide an empirical confirmation of Semitu’s 
application of Katz to Facebook. Most importantly with this approach, I hope to add some 
empirical clarity to the over-arching legal debate and question: do Facebook users have a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” on Facebook?  
First, I will revisit Benson’s (2009) claims about self-revelation on Facebook. Benson 
found that standards of appropriateness did not vary greatly from offline to online. In other 
words, self-revelation on Facebook was mostly consistent with self-revelation offline. However, 
this conclusion was based on a study of college students in 2008. Older Facebook users may act 
differently on Facebook than younger users, and standards may have changed over the last four 
years as the site has grown.  
The Net Generation and Self-Revelation on the Internet 
Generational cohort is an important determining factor in an individual’s attitudes 
towards and experience with online technologies (Tapscott, 2009). Tapscott (2009) defines the 
Net Generation as individuals who are currently aged 29 and younger and have grown up with 
the Internet. “Net Geners” have spent their formative years in a technological environment 
completely different from their parents and grandparents (Tapscott, 2009). Older generations 
may have different attitudes towards online privacy because they didn’t grow up in this same 
environment. Tapscott (2009) claims that “Generation Xers,” individuals currently in their 30s, 
most closely resemble the Net Generation in their Internet behaviors and attitudes. Based on 
Tapscott’s analysis, I will conduct a comparison of self-revelation across these three generational 




Since the Net Generation has grown up in an environment where sharing private 
information online is the norm, members of this generation are more likely to reveal more 
information online than older generations (Palfry & Gasser, 2008). Palfry and Gasser discuss 
why young people may reveal more: “The digital age has brought about a new incentive to reveal 
information about oneself while reducing checks on imprudent behavior” (2008, p. 54).  
Based on Tapscott’s and Palfry & Gasser’s findings, I predict that: 
H1: The Net Generation will engage in greater self-revelation on Facebook than older 
generations. 
  Benson (2009) found that college students’ self-revelation did not differ significantly 
from offline to online. However, based on the differences between the Net Generation and the 
older generations, I do not think that this finding will be replicated for older generations. Since 
older generations are less comfortable revealing information online (Palfry & Gasser, 2008), it is 
likely their self-revelation will change from offline to online.  I expect to find the following 
results in my research: 
H2: The Net Generation will engage in more comparable offline and Facebook self-revelation 
than older generations.  
Facebook Privacy Protection 
 Next, expanding upon Benson’s approach, I will compare privacy protection on 
Facebook to privacy protection offline. However, before I can compare offline and online 
privacy protection, I must first understand what type of privacy protection is used on Facebook. 
Facebook enables users to control the image that is presented on their profile or to limit who has 
access to this image via privacy controls, image management, and friend selectivity.  Privacy 




Privacy controls can be set so that only a select group of individuals, determined by the user is 
allowed to view content. Image management is comprised of decisions about which Facebook 
content is viewable on Facebook. For example, Facebook users engage in image management 
when they delete inappropriate content. Friend selectivity is comprised of the decisions about 
which Facebook users are considered acceptable “friends.” Debatin et al. (2009) found that 
“although many [users] restrict their profiles, they do not seem to fully understand that their level 
of privacy protection is relative to the number of friends, their criteria for accepting friends, and 
the amount and quality of personal data provided in their profiles” (p. 102). In other words, 
image management and friend selectivity serve as an extra safeguard for privacy. 
Thus, my first research question: 
RQ1: How often to Facebook users engage in privacy protection, as exhibited by the use of 
privacy controls, image management, and friend selectivity? 
Variables that Predict Privacy Protection 
The extent to which these three types of privacy protection are used on Facebook could 
be influenced by a variety of factors. Previous psychological research has found online privacy 
concerns to be influenced by generational cohort, gender, and personality variables. I also predict 
that the knowledge of Facebook privacy settings, network size, and role heterogeneity may 
influence privacy protection efforts. Next, I will review the theoretical inspiration behind each 
independent variable in detail.  
The Net Generation 
Generational cohorts have been found to be an important influence on the determination 
of online behavioral norms; however, this discussion has mostly focused on self-revelation 




Net Generation may also use different online privacy protection strategies, compared to their 
older counterparts. Since the Net Generation is more likely than older generations to feel that 
sharing information online is the norm (Palfry & Gasser, 2008), it follows that the Net 
Generation may also feel less compelled to protect personal information. Expanding on 
Tapscott’s and Palfry & Gasser’s findings, I predict that: 
H3: The Net Generation employs less stringent privacy controls, image management and 
friendship selectivity on Facebook than older generations.   
Gender 
In previous studies, females were found to employ more stringent privacy settings than 
males on Facebook (Lewis et al., 2009). However, females also post more photos on Facebook 
than males (Benson, 2009). While females may use more stringent privacy settings than males, 
they may also be more likely to have photos considered “inappropriate” on their Facebook wall 
than males. Users must balance the use of privacy controls with self-revelation. This is a theme I 
will revisit throughout the thesis. 
H4: Females employ more stringent privacy controls, image management and friend selectivity 
on Facebook than males. 
Privacy Controls Knowledge 
A Facebook user’s familiarity with privacy controls may also influence the stringency of 
his or her privacy protection.  Users may want to have more stringent privacy settings but may 
not know how to change them or may think that they have more stringent privacy settings than 
they actually do. Facebook updates its privacy policies and privacy controls once or twice a year. 
If users are not up to date with the most recent privacy controls, their content may not be 




to what their actual settings were and found that only 12.7% of respondents said they were up to 
date on Facebook’s policy changes and correctly stated their settings.  Interestingly enough, only 
8% of respondents reported that they weren’t confident in their knowledge and understanding of 
their privacy settings on Facebook (Butler et al., 2011).  
Based on Butler et al.’s findings: 
H5: Users with greater privacy controls knowledge will employ more stringent privacy controls 
on Facebook.  
Personality Variables 
 Junglas et al. (2008) studied the relationship between personality variables and a concern 
for online privacy. They defined a concern for privacy as “the anxious sense of interest that a 
person has because of various types of threats to the person’s state of being free from intrusion” 
(p. 367). A concern for privacy was determined to be positively related to adaptive responses to 
threats, such as engaging in privacy protection (Junglas et al., 2008). The personality attributes 
studied were based on the Big Five framework: agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability, extraversion, and openness to experience.  Junglas et al. (2008) found only three of the 
five personality attributes to correlate significantly with a concern for privacy. Highly agreeable 
individuals, who strive for harmonious relationships and are more likely to trust their 
environment, had lower privacy concerns than non-agreeable individuals. Conscientious 
individuals, who are organized, meticulous, and deliberate, had a higher concern for privacy than 
non-conscientious individuals. Lastly, individuals open to experiencing new things also had a 




Highly agreeable individuals on Facebook, since they are less suspicious of their 
environment, should be more likely to assume that their Facebook friends would approve of 
revealing private information.  
H6: Highly agreeable individuals on Facebook will employ less stringent privacy controls, 
image management and friend selectivity than less agreeable individuals.  
Highly conscientious individuals are logical, foresighted, organized, and disciplined, with 
a “tendency to adhere to standards and principles” (Junglas et al. 1991, p. 392). These 
individuals should be more concerned about what others may do with the personal information 
they have posted online (Junglas et al., 2008).   
H7: Highly conscientious individuals on Facebook will employ more stringent privacy controls, 
image management and friend selectivity than less conscientious individuals.  
 Individuals open to new experiences will have had more variegated life experiences, both 
positive and negative (Junglas et al., 2008). Because of this, “open individuals have developed a 
broader and deeper sense of awareness” (Junglas et al., 2008, p. 393). Junglas et al. (2008) found 
that this broader awareness manifested itself in an increased concern for privacy online.  
H8: Individuals open to experience will employ more stringent privacy controls, image 
management and friend selectivity than individuals less open to experience.  
Although Junglas et al. (2008) did not find extraversion to correlate significantly with 
online privacy concerns, I predict that extraversion should influence privacy protection on 
Facebook. Extraverted individuals are more likely to take risks, to make efforts to provide 
information about themselves, and to obtain information about others (Junglas et al., 2008). 
Based on these tendencies, I predict that extraverted individuals will engage in less stringent 




H9: Extraverted individuals will employ less stringent privacy controls, image management and 
friend selectivity than individuals less open to experience.  
Role Heterogeneity 
According to Goffman’s theatrical analogy, life is composed of a front stage and a 
backstage (1959). While on the front stage, the social actor makes a positive impression on his 
audience based on how well he conforms to the norms expected by that audience. For each 
audience, the social actor has the ability to choose his stage, props and costume.  While back 
stage, the social actor is able to step out of character and present the “real” self. Role 
heterogeneity is the extent to which front stage and backstage audiences are present in your 
social network at the same. Greater role heterogeneity may mean greater conflict about which 
role, front stage or backstage, the social actor should utilize.  
Benson (2009) uses Goffman’s theory to analyze responses in her interviews.  When 
considering Facebook in Goffman’s terms, Benson hypothesized that users with more stringent 
settings would behave in a more “backstage” manner on Facebook than other users because they 
were able to limit the access of certain audiences such as prospective employers (2009). 
However, Benson found that users had stringent privacy controls regardless of their online 
behavior.  The difference between front stage and backstage behavior on Facebook was found to 
have more to do with internal rather than external concerns for privacy. College students, 
concerned about other audiences such as family members, teachers and employers seeing various 
“backstage” behaviors on their Facebook, treated their profile as a permanently front stage 
environment, and expected other users to do the same (Benson, 2009). Students can also use 




inappropriate and engage in image management to remove that content altogether from 
Facebook.   
Based on Benson’s findings, I predict role heterogeneity will play a factor in determining 
an individual’s Facebook privacy protection. An individual with greater role heterogeneity will 
have more audiences to exclude from various aspects of his or her backstage self. 
H10: Users with greater Facebook role heterogeneity will utilize more stringent privacy controls 
and engage in more extensive image management.  
Cyberspace is also inherently different from the offline world in that a person is more 
likely to have front stage and backstage audiences present at the same time. For example, 
Facebook combines both backstage and front stage audiences (friends, parents, family members, 
teachers, and employers) on one social networking site. Offline, not only is it less likely that 
audiences with conflicting behavioral expectations will be present at the same, but also a person 
is able to physically keep track of which audiences are present and choose when to act in a front 
stage or backstage manner accordingly. Thus, I predict the effect of role heterogeneity to have a 
greater effect online than it does offline.  
H11: Role heterogeneity will have a greater effect on the engagement in privacy protection on 
Facebook than offline.   
Network Size 
 Network size could also influence a user’s engagement in privacy protection both offline 
and online. Network size refers to the amount of friends a person has in their social network. 
Greater network sizes are inherently less private. Thus, I predict Facebook users with greater 




H12: Users with a larger network size will employ more stringent Facebook privacy controls 
and engage in more extensive image management.  
 Network size is likely to have a greater effect on Facebook than offline because Facebook 
provides users an opportunity to correspond electronically with friends on a greater scale than 
physically possible in an offline setting. Therefore, I predict network size to have a greater 
influence on Facebook than it does offline.  
H13: Network size will have a greater effect on the engagement in privacy protection on 
Facebook than offline. 
A Comparison of Offline and Online Privacy Protection 
  This research centers on the question: do Facebook users have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy? The Supreme Court, in Katz, developed a two-step test to determine whether or not a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists. First an individual must have exhibited an expectation 
of privacy and secondly, society must acknowledge this expectation of privacy as reasonable, 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 361. Legal scholars have argued that the use of privacy controls 
affords users an expectation of privacy because it is the online legal equivalent to shutting the 
door to a public phone booth. (Semitsu, 2011). I will test this argument with empirical research. 
Do Facebook users take the same steps to protect their Facebook content as they do to protect 
private information offline? For example, does a Facebook user who refrains from talking about 
drinking in public also refrain from positing comments referencing drinking on Facebook? Thus, 
I answer this question by comparing offline and online privacy protection. If Facebook privacy 
protection is similar to offline privacy protection, then Facebook users also exhibit an 




I predict that online privacy protection will be similar to offline privacy protection. 
Benson’s findings (2009) regarding self-revelation suggest that, in general, online and offline 
behaviors do not differ as much as expected. Thus, it can be logically extended that an 
individual’s privacy protection online and offline should also be relatively similar. 
H14:  Facebook users who engage in more stringent privacy protection offline will also engage 
in more stringent privacy controls, image management, and friend selectivity on Facebook. 
 Although it is predicted that Facebook users will exhibit an expectation of privacy, this 
expectation of privacy will not be recognized by the courts unless the second part of the Katz test 
is also confirmed. The second question to be asked is: will society recognize this expectation of 
privacy as reasonable? One way of predicting whether or not an individual will see something as 
reasonable is by the extent to which a person performs an action. Thus, people who are more 
likely to engage in Facebook privacy protection are also more likely to feel that these behaviors 
guarantee a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, people who engage in privacy 
protection on Facebook to a lesser extent may be less likely to feel that these behaviors guarantee 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, to determine whether or not society feels that this 
expectation of privacy on Facebook is reasonable, I will identify which groups of Facebook users 
participate in less self-revelation and more privacy protection on Facebook.  
Generational cohort has already been predicted to influence the extent to which a 
Facebook user engages in self-revelation and privacy protection on Facebook. Because of the 
differing amount of online experience that the Net Generation and older generations have had, I 
predict that these generational cohorts will have a different sense of what is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on Facebook.  Having grown up with the Internet and social media sites, 




which behaviors on Facebook guarantee a sense of privacy (Palfry & Gasser, 2008; Benson, 
2009) Older generations, growing up in a different technological environment, may be cautious 
to accept the norms that the Net Generation has already established on Facebook, especially if 
these behaviors are not entirely consistent with traditional privacy norms as predicted by 
Tapscott (2009) and Palfry & Gasser (2008). Instead, older generations may apply offline 
privacy norms as they navigate privacy boundaries in cyberspace. 
Thus, I predict that: 
H15: The Baby Boomers and Generation Xers will engage in more comparable offline and 
Facebook privacy protection than the Net Generation.   
Method 
Data Collection and Sample 
The survey data is composed of two distinct samples. In both samples, all respondents 
signed an informed consent form prior to filling out the survey. Also, all respondents currently 
had a Facebook. Since the survey focuses on comparing behaviors on Facebook to offline 
behaviors, the survey was only directed towards and distributed to individuals who reported that 
they currently have a Facebook.  
The first sample is composed of 381 respondents recruited using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. The Amazon Mechanical Turk sample composed of three smaller age group samples, 18-
25, 26-35, and 36 and older, loosely based on Tapscott’s (2009) generational cohort definitions 
with 155 (41%) respondents in the 18-25 age group, 110 (29%) respondents in the 26-35 age 
group and 116 (30%) respondents in the 36 and older age group. The mean age of the sample 




Amazon Mechanical Turk users with other Mechanical Turk users of different age groups, I will 
better be able to distinguish the impact of age on privacy protection.  
 Of the Mechanical Turk respondents, 194 (51%) were male and 187 (49%) were female. 
Thirty percent of respondents had completed a four-year college degree, 17% were currently 
enrolled at a 4 year college, and 14% had completed high school but had not pursued higher 
education. Forty-nine percent of respondents were Caucasian, non-Hispanic, 25% were Asian, 
and 16% were Hispanic. Yearly household income self-reports ranged from less than $10,000 to 
more than $150,000 with 53% of respondents making less than $40,000 per year and 16% 
making $90,000 or more per year. All respondents currently had a Facebook. Thirty percent of 
the respondents had had a Facebook for more than 4 years and 64% of respondents had had a 
Facebook for 2 years or more. Forty-seven percent of respondents check their Facebook at least 
once per day, with 67% checking it at least once per week. Eight-five percent of respondents 
spend 30 minutes or on their Facebook at a time with 70% spending 15 minutes or less at a time 
on their Facebook (See Appendix A for demographic tables of this sample). 
The second sample consisted of 60 college students at a large, public, Midwestern 
university who were recruited from an undergraduate participant pool and received course credit 
for participating. In the college sample, 40 (67%) were female and 20 (33%) were male. Fifty-
two percent were freshmen and 23% were sophomores and 43% were 19 years old and 27% were 
18. All respondents currently had a Facebook and 90% had had a Facebook for 4 or more years. 
100% of respondents check their Facebook at least once a week and 90% check their Facebook 
daily. When checking their Facebook, 97% spend less than 30 minutes on Facebook at a time 




The Amazon Mechanical Turk 18-25 age sample is an important and unique cohort 
because it includes the Net Generation and it also corresponds with the largest U.S. Facebook 
age demographic with over 50 million users (“Facebook Demographics”; Tapscott, 2009). The 
second sample of college students will be compared to this sample as a methodological and 
internal check. While respondents in these samples are similar in age, they may not be similar in 
other demographical variables. College students are traditionally more likely to be upper-class, 
educated, and more technologically savvy. Findings from the college sample will be compared 
with findings from the Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, predicted to be more diverse, as a way 
to compensate for unknown differences between the two samples and also to distinguish among 
possible groups of Facebook users in this cohort who may engage differently in self-revelation 
and privacy protection. Results were found to be very similar between these two groups (See 
Appendix C).  
While survey responses can help to determine whether or not Facebook users act in a way 
that guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy, these responses are not necessarily the best 
way to discover why Facebook users choose to act in these ways and whether or not Facebook 
users feel that they have an expectation of privacy on Facebook. Ten survey respondents of 
various ages and genders were asked to participate in an interview that would expand on their 
survey responses to address some of these ideas. All interview participants signed an informed 
consent form prior to participating in the interview and all participants who were part of the 
Communication Studies undergraduate participant pool received course credit. 
Measures 
The survey instrument consisted of 71 questions to measure the following central 




Online privacy protection, (4) Offline privacy protection, (5) Online role heterogeneity, (6) 
Offline role heterogeneity, (7) Privacy controls knowledge (8) Offline network size, and (9) 
Online network size. These measures were created and analyzed for the first time in this survey 
on both sample populations.  Statistical analysis determining the reliability of these measures 
will be a helpful tool for the future creation of measures about self-revelation and privacy 
protection both online and offline in upcoming studies. Variables shown in previous studies to be 
related to privacy concerns and predicted to be related to privacy protection were also measured: 
(1) personality traits and (2) demographic variables such as gender and generational cohort. (See 
Appendix D for an overview of all indices used in this study, Appendix E for a complete list of 
survey questions used for the college sample, and Appendix F for a complete list of survey 
questions used for the Mechanical Turk sample.)   
Online self-revelation measures the extent to which the respondent reveals private 
information on Facebook. The scale is based on behaviors deemed by interviewees in the Benson 
study as “Facebook inappropriate”. Interviewees named the following behaviors as 
inappropriate: nudity, excessive drinking, drug use, calling other people names, inappropriate 
photos with significant others, racial slurs, political comments, and swear words. A nine-item 
index was created to assess how often a Facebook user reveals inappropriate information on 
Facebook. Responses rated statements on a four-point scale with 1 as “never”, 2 as “sometimes”, 
3 as “occasionally”, and 4 as “often.” Statements included: “I use swear words in a comment or 
status,” “I post or am tagged in photos wearing revealing clothing,” and “I reference excessive 
drinking in a comment or status.” Users who admitted to posting or being tagged in inappropriate 
photos also indicated the placement of these photos on Facebook. For instance, profile pictures 




respondent was then asked “have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?” If 
respondents indicated that they had posted or been tagged in photos concerning a specific 
behavior, the “yes” was given 1 point and a response of “no” was given 0. The online self-
revelation index is composed of the score totals from both of these question types with a higher 
score signifying greater self-revelation. Thirteen items were aggregated for further analysis 




Offline self-revelation was measured by analogizing interactions with Facebook friends to 
offline interactions with friends. Since Facebook users, in theory, share their content with their 
"friends," a proper measurement of offline self-revelation should involve revealing private 
information to friends. To keep this measure consistent with the Facebook index, each Facebook 
item was converted into an offline item. For example, the following statement asked in the 
previous index “I use swear words in a comment or status” was changed to “I use swear words 
when I talk to my friends.”  Offline self-revelation was measured with a seven-item index. 
Respondents assessed each statement with a four point scale from 1 as “never” to 4 as “often.”  
Other statements included: “I wear revealing clothing when I go out to a party or bar with my 
friends,” and “I talk about excessive drinking with my friends.” Raw scores were summed, with 
higher values indicating greater self-revelation (Cronbach’s α = .82 for Mechanical Turk sample; 
Cronbach’s α =.74 for college sample). 
To measure offline privacy protection, respondents were asked about behaviors that limit 
to whom they reveal information about their private life or, in other words, behaviors that create 
privacy. The items were built in two parts. The first part, the private information that was being 
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 In college sample, one item ( “Have you ever made a profile picture out of a photo of you using drugs”) was 




revealed, was based on the self-revelation indices. The second part, the limiting of who this 
information is being revealed too, was based on the Katz ruling that the act of shutting a 
telephone booth door constitutes the creation of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Behaviors 
that also limit the availability of private information to the public such as “refrain[ing] from 
talking about excessive drinking in public” were used in the measure. The index also included 
several statements which were reverse coded such as: “I talk on the phone about excessive 
drinking when I am in front of my parents,” and “I wear revealing clothing to work.” 
Respondents rated statements on a four-point scale from 1 as “never” to 4 as “often.” The eight-
item index was moderately reliable in both the Mechanical Turk (Cronbach’s α =.71) and college 
sample (Cronbach’s α =.69).  
Online privacy protection tapped behaviors that limit not only the audience who is able to 
see a user’s content online and but also what type of content is available online. Online privacy 
protection is composed of three separate indices: 1) privacy controls, 2) image management, and 
3) friend selectivity. Privacy controls include Facebook created privacy settings that limit who is 
able to see a user’s content. Image management is composed of self-monitoring behaviors such 
as when users delete or refrain from posting content that they consider to be inappropriate. 
Friend selectivity involves the decisions about which Facebook users are considered to be 
acceptable friends. 
The privacy control index is made up of three questions about privacy settings. Each 
question has three responses that are taken from the language that Facebook actually uses 
“public”, “friends only”, and “custom”. Responses are scored from 1 as “public” to 3 as 
“custom” with higher values representing more stringent privacy controls (α =.87 for Mechanical 




asked about which groups they allow to see their content to get a better idea of which groups 
(close friends, parents, siblings, past or current employers, people under 18, past or current 
teachers) among their Facebook friends that they include or exclude. The image management 
index is composed of three questions which ask about self-monitoring and editing behaviors with 
answer choices rated from 1 as “never” to 4 as “often”. Two of these items were aggregated and 
summed with higher values signifying greater image management (α =.61 for Mechanical Turk 
sample and college sample).
2
 The friend selectivity index is measured by two questions which 
ask about a respondent’s tendency to accept friend requests. The first asks “who would you 
accept as a friend?” with responses from “only close friends” to “anybody.” The second asks 
“how well do you need to know someone before accepting a friend request on Facebook?” with 
answer choices ranging from 1 as “not well at all” to 5 as “extremely well.” The two items were 
aggregated with a higher score indicating greater selectivity when accepting friends (Cronbach’s 
α =.60 for Mechanical Turk sample and Cronbach’s α =.43 for college sample).  
 Offline and Facebook network size were measured by self-report. To measure offline 
network size, respondents were asked “about how many friends do you hang out with on a 
regular basis?” Online network size was measured with two questions: “about how many 
Facebook friends do you have?” and “how many Facebook friends would you consider to be 
close friends?” 
 Online role heterogeneity, measured with four items, assessed the diversity of Facebook 
networks. It is a count of the friends a user has from various groups not traditionally considered 
to be part of a peer group such as: “family members”, “past or current employers”, “people under 
18”, and “past or current teachers or GSIs”. Respondents estimated the number of Facebook 
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friends they have in each group. These estimates were then divided by the total Facebook 
network size to create four different online role heterogeneity ratio variables which describe the 
extent to which their Facebook friends are family, employer, under 18, or teacher heterogeneous.   
 Offline role heterogeneity, analogous to role heterogeneity on Facebook, is defined as the 
extent to which a respondent finds himself or herself in a situation when both peers and non-
peers are in attendance. For example, respondents were asked how often they invite friends over 
to their house while their parents are home or sign up for a class with a friend. These situations 
combine friends with parents and friends with teachers, respectively. Offline role heterogeneity 
was measured with four items, each describing a heterogeneous situation with the same four 
groups used in the online role heterogeneity variable: family, employer, under 18, and teacher.  
Responses rated from 4 as “often” to 1 as “never.”  
 The privacy controls knowledge index is comprised of five questions which ask 
respondents about their knowledge of and comfort with Facebook’s privacy controls. This index 
was based on a similar study by Butler et al. (2011). The first four questions, measured on a five-
point Likert scale, with 5 as “strongly agree” and 1 as “strongly disagree.” Statements include “I 
feel comfortable using Facebook’s privacy settings” and “I was aware that Facebook updated its 
privacy controls in September of 2011.” Respondents were also asked the last time they adjusted 
their privacy controls, with available responses from 6 as “In the last month,” to 1 as “In the last 






knowledge of privacy controls (Cronbach’s α =.68 for Mechanical Turk; Cronbach’s α =.70 for 
college sample).
3
   
 Personality traits were measured by indexes developed in past research. The Big Five 
personality traits were assessed using a ten-item scale developed and validated by Gosling et al. 
(2003). Responses for each item were scored with a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 as 
“strongly disagree” to 7 as “strongly agree.” This ten-item scale, more efficient time-wise than 
other personality measurements, has also been shown to be valid by both Gosling et al. and other 
researchers (Muck et al. 2007). See Table 1 for a comparison of Cronbach’s Alphas calculated 
for each of the five personality indices. In the Mechanical Turk sample, two of the indices, 
agreeableness and openness, returned low reliability. In the college sample, conscientiousness 
returned low reliability. Demographic variables: gender, age, race, income, and current education 
level were also measured. 
 
Table 1: Cronbach’s Alpha for Big-Five Personality Trait Indices (α =) 
Personality Trait                              Mechanical Turk Sample                College Sample 
 
Agreeableness                                                   .38                                         .64    
Conscientiousness                                             .60                                         .28 
Emotional Stability                                           .66                                         .69 
Extraversion                                                      .73                                         .78 
Openness                                                          .33                                          .65 
 
                                                          
3
 In both samples, one item (“I was aware that Facebook update its privacy controls in September of 2011”) was 
deleted from the knowledge of privacy controls index because it wasn’t as strongly correlated with the other items. 
After further reflection, the item is less about the knowledge of Facebook privacy controls and more about the 
knowledge of Facebook practices. For example, Facebook users could have realized Facebook’s adjustment of 
privacy controls and adapted to this change in October but might not have known that this change actually occurred 






A Comparison of Offline and Online Self-Revelation 
Survey responses were analyzed to test each of the 15 hypotheses. Data analysis 
commenced with the extension of Benson’s (2009) previous research on comparing self-
revelation on Facebook and offline. Employing a larger and more diverse sample, I found that 
offline and online self-revelation indices are highly correlated (r=.51, p<.01). Individuals who 
are more self-revelatory online are also more self revelatory offline. However, Facebook users 
were found to reveal more personal information offline (Median = .54) than online (Median = 
.34).
 4
 This suggests that people are more concerned about revealing inappropriate information 
online than off. 
Another difference between offline and online self-revelation was seen in the distribution 
of survey respondents. While offline self-revelation was normally distributed, online self-
revelation was unexpectedly skewed to the left, which means that the graph has a long tail to the 
right (See Figures 1 and 2). This finding is unexpected because these two indices were created to 
be conceptually identical by analogizing self-revelation online and offline. As discussed above, 
the same self-revelatory behaviors were tapped for both indices. The only difference was 
whether the information was being revealed to friends in an offline setting or on Facebook. 
Because these indices were created to measure the same conceptual range of behavior, the 
difference in these distributions suggest that online and offline self-revelation are distinct 
phenomena. Again, it appears that Facebook users are more concerned about revealing personal 
information online than offline. This concern could stem from a fear that their Facebook content 
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 Because the Facebook self-revelation distribution was so skewed, medians and not means were used for this 
comparison. As a result, a Paired Samples T-Test could not be used to determine whether or not this large distance 





will not remain private. Sharing personal information online is not perceived as secure as sharing 
information face to face.   
 
                        Figure 1:                                                                         Figure 2: 
   Histogram of Offline Self-Revelation                           Histogram of Online Self-Revelation 
 
              
 
The online self-revelation distribution has outliers with very high self-revelatory scores 
that are pulling the distribution to the right. To find out which individuals were a part of this 
group, a regression was performed for both online and offline self-revelation to study the 
association of these indices with several variables discussed above to be predictors of online 
privacy protection: demographics, personality variables, generational cohorts, role heterogeneity, 
and network size. 
The linear regression isolated the association of each one of the 18 independent variables 




The two regressions were then compared to see whether similar factors predict self-revelation 
online and offline (See Table 2).  
 






White 0.01 0.12** 
Asian -0.02 0.02 
Black -0.02 0.07 
Female -0.01 0.00 




Agreeableness -0.08* -0.22** 
Conscientiousness -0.08* -0.12* 
Emotional Stability -0.02 -0.01 
Extraversion 0.08** -0.00 
Openness 0.05 0.10
^ 
Generation Xers 0.01 -0.02 
Baby Boomers -0.04* -0.11** 
Role Heterogeneity Family -0.02 -0.01 
Role Heterogeneity Employers -0.03 -0.02 
Role Heterogeneity Under 18 -0.01 0.00 
Role Heterogeneity Teacher 0.08 0.10** 
Network Size 0.19** 0.05 
N 361 357 
R
2
 .244 .245 
*significant at p< .05,  ** significant at p<.01, ^significant at p <.10 
 
H1 and H2 both predicted that generational cohorts would exhibit distinct patters of 
online self-revelation. In H1, the Net Generation was expected to have greater self-revelation on 
Facebook. As seen in the comparison of self-revelation medians by generational cohort (See 
Figure 3), the Net Geners had the greatest self-revelation both on Facebook and offline. I was 




Geners and Baby Boomers online self-revelation is significant since the online self-revelation 
distribution was skewed. However, the regression analysis confirmed H1. Baby Boomers were 
slightly, but significantly lower in Facebook self-revelation than the Net Generation. Therefore, 
as predicted, Baby Boomers share significantly less personal information online than younger 
generations.  
 
Figure 3: A Comparison of Offline and Online Self-Revelation Medians by Generational Cohort 
 
 
H2 predicted that the Net Generation would have more comparable offline and online 
self-revelation than older generations. An interaction was calculated to determine the distinct 
relationship between online and offline self-revelation by generational cohort (See Figure 4). H2 
was also confirmed.  Net Geners exhibited a strong, positive, and significant correlation between 
offline and online privacy protection. Net Geners who are more self-revelatory offline are also 










































association between self-revelation offline and online. This means that Baby Boomers who share 
more information offline actually share less information online. The association for Generation 
Xers was, as predicted, in the middle of these two groups. Generation Xers are more similar than 
Baby Boomers to the online behavior of Net Geners. 
 
Figure 4: The Relationship of Offline and Online Self-Revelation by Generational Cohort 
 
 
Several demographic variables were differentially related to self-revelation online and 
offline. White respondents were higher in offline self-revelation than other groups, but racial 
groups were not distinct in terms of online self-revelation. Income and current education level 
were also negatively associated with online self-revelation, but unrelated to offline self-
revelation. This means that individuals with low income levels and low current education levels 
















































Although specific predictions were not made regarding the influence of personality 
variables, personality was also found to influence self-revelation both online and offline. 
Agreeableness and conscientiousness were found to significantly predict self-revelation both 
online and offline. Agreeableness had a large, negative, and significant association with offline 
self-revelation and a small, negative, and significant association with Facebook self-revelation. 
Conscientiousness had a negative and significant correlation with both online and offline, but to 
a greater extent offline. In addition, extraversion had a small but positive and significant 
correlation with online but not offline self-revelation and openness had a moderate, positive 
correlation at marginal significance with offline self-revelation. In general, individuals, who are 
less agreeable, less conscientious, and more extraverted, exhibited greater self-revelation online.  
Lastly, network size was differentially related to online and offline self-revelation. 
Facebook network size had a large, positive, significant correlation with Facebook self-
revelation, but not with offline self-revelation. Individuals who have a larger network size on 
Facebook share more personal information than individuals will a smaller network size. It is 
possible that network size did not have a significant influence offline because offline networks 
are usually much smaller than those online.   
While online and offline self-revelation were found to be similar, the same predicting 
variables, in general, did not significantly correlate with both online and offline self-revelation. 
The only predicting variables that these indices had in common were agreeableness, 
conscientiousness and generational cohort. Net Geners and individuals who are less agreeable 
and conscientious were found to have greater self-revelation both online and offline. However, 
individuals who engage in less self-revelation on Facebook than offline have higher incomes and 




online and offline self-revelation may be similar, not all users engage in online and offline self-
revelation that is similar. While lower income and education level, larger network size and 
extraversion were not initially hypothesized to predict greater self-revelation, these findings help 
to create an image of the group of individuals who skew the distribution of Facebook self-
revelation.  
Correlates of Privacy Protection 
The first research question explored which types of Facebook privacy protection are 
implemented by Facebook users. The use of privacy controls, image management and friend 
selectivity were all studied. Using a comparison of means, it was found that while all types of 
privacy protection are implemented, privacy controls are the most commonly used privacy 




Next, I regressed these three online privacy protections, the demographic variables, 
personality variables, generational cohort, role heterogeneity, and network size measured in the 
previous model. A linear regression was performed on each of the three privacy protection 
indices: privacy controls, image management, and friend selectivity. A linear regression was also 
performed on the offline privacy protection index and compared with the three previous 
regressions in order see whether or not the same correlates affect offline and online privacy 
protection (See Table 3). The demographic, personality, and generational cohort variables were 
used in both the offline and online regressions. However, for role heterogeneity and network 
size, different but analogous variables (described in the Methods section) created to measure role 
heterogeneity and network size online and offline were used. Therefore in the online regressions, 
Facebook role heterogeneity and network size variables were used and in the offline regression, 
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offline role heterogeneity and network size variables replaced the Facebook variables. The 
results from these regressions encompass the results for hypotheses 3 through 13.  
H3 predicted that the Net Generation would engage in less stringent privacy protection 
than older generations. First, means were compared to determine whether Net Geners, on 
average, engage in less stringent privacy protection. Net Geners were found, on average, to have 
less stringent friend selectivity, but more stringent image management than older generations, 
and privacy controls consistent with older generations (See Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: A Comparison of Online Privacy Protection Means by Generational Cohort 
 
 
An Independent Samples T-Test was used to determine that the difference between Net Geners 
and Baby Boomers was significant for both image management at friend selectivity at p=.00 (See 
Appendix G and Appendix H).  The use of Facebook privacy controls did not differ significantly 
between generations (See Appendix I). Thus, it appears that all generations, on average, use a 





























































To determine if this finding was consistent for the generational distribution as a whole, 
the B values in the regression table were compared (See Table 3). Baby Boomers had a small, 
negative, and marginally significant association with privacy controls and a small, negative and 
significant association with image management. There was no significant generational difference 
for friend selectivity. Generation Xers also had negative associations with privacy controls and 
image management; however, these associations were not significant. This means that Net 
Geners, the excluded group in these models, actually exhibited the highest use of privacy 
controls and image management of any generation as a whole. Image Management was found by 
both the comparison of means and the regression to be more stringently used by the Net 
Generation than older generation. This finding also implies that Net Geners are more likely than 
older generations to use the “Custom” Facebook privacy control which goes a step further in 
privatizing content than the “Friends” control described above. The “Custom” setting not only 
limits content from the public view, but also from the view specific Facebook friends.   
Females were predicted to engage in more stringent privacy protection than males (H4). 
As predicted, females had a small, positive, but marginally significant correlation with the use of 
privacy controls. Consistent with H4, females use more privacy controls than men. However, 
image management and friend selectivity did not vary significantly between men and women. 
While females have been shown in the past to have more stringent privacy settings (Lewis et 
al.,2009), gender does not appear to influence the use of image management and friend 
selectivity. The engagement in offline privacy protection also did not vary significantly between 
men and women. Current education level was another demographic variable with a moderate, 




Table 3: A Regression Analysis of the Correlates of Online and Offline Privacy Protection 
*significant at p < .05, **significant at p< .01, ^significant at p<.10
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 There was no analogous offline measure for knowledge of privacy settings, so this concept was not included in the offline privacy protection regression. 
Predicting Variables 
Facebook Privacy Protection Offline 
Privacy Protection (B) Privacy controls (B) Image Management (B) Friend selectivity (B) 
White 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Black -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 
Female 0.04
^
 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
Income 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 
Current Education Level 0.10
^
 0.06 0.07 0.03 
Agreeableness 0.04 -0.10 0.07 0.13** 
Conscientiousness 0.14* 0.02 -0.01 0.13** 
Emotional Stability -0.11 0.01 0.05 0.03 
Extraversion -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.05 
Openness 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
Generation Xers -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 
Baby Boomers -0.05
^
 -0.06* 0.01 0.06** 
Privacy Controls Knowledge 0.21** 0.17** 0.05 -------
6
 
Role Heterogeneity Family 0.03 0.08 .31** 0.02 
Role Heterogeneity Employers -0.13 0.07 0.08 -0.03 
Role Heterogeneity Under 18 -0.02 0.15 0.00 -0.05 
Role Heterogeneity Teachers -0.09 0.38 -0.02 0.00 
Network Size -0.13 0.47** -0.22** -0.16* 
N 348 371 368 357 
R
2




who had a higher education level used more stringent privacy controls. The other demographic 
variables were not found to be predictors of online or offline privacy protection. 
In H5, privacy controls knowledge was predicted to be positively correlated with the use 
of privacy controls on Facebook. The Net Generation was found to be most knowledgeable about 
privacy controls (See Figure 6).
7
  This difference between the privacy controls knowledge of Net 
Geners and Baby Boomers was found to be statistically significant at p<.05 after performing an 
Independent Samples T-Test (See Appendix J). Consistent with H5, the knowledge of Facebook 
privacy protection was positively and significantly correlated with the use of privacy controls. 
Since there is no analogous offline measure for privacy controls knowledge, there will be no 
online and offline comparison. 
Personality variables were also expected to predict engagement in privacy protection on 
Facebook. Highly conscientious individuals (H7) and individuals more open to experience (H8) 
were expected to engage in more stringent privacy protection. Highly agreeable (H6) and 
extraverted (H9) individuals were expected to engage in less stringent privacy protection. As 
predicted in H7, conscientiousness had a moderate, positive, and significant association with 
Facebook privacy controls and offline privacy protection. Agreeableness also had a moderate, 
positive and significant correlation only with offline privacy protection. Contrary to hypotheses 
H6, H8 and H9, agreeableness, openness, and extraversion were not found to be predictors of 
online privacy protection.  
According to H10, greater role heterogeneity was expected to predict greater engagement 
in Facebook privacy controls and image management. This relationship was also predicted to be 
greater online than offline (H11). Contrary to H10, the engagement in privacy protection did not 
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Figure 6: A Comparison of Privacy Controls Knowledge Means by Generational Cohort 
 
 
vary significantly by greater role heterogeneity of family, teachers, individuals under the age of 
18 or employers either on Facebook or offline. However, greater family role heterogeneity did 
have a strong, positive and significant correlation with friend selectivity. This relationship is 
logical because those who are more stringent in their friend selectivity are more stringent 
because they only accept Facebook friends who are more close to them, such as family members 
and close friends. Contrary to H11, the association of role heterogeneity with privacy protection 
did not vary significantly from offline to online. 
Lastly, network size was predicted by H12 to be associated with enhanced use of privacy 
controls and image management on Facebook. I expected the relationship to be greater on  
Facebook than offline (H13). H12 was partially supported. Network size was strongly, positively 
and significantly associated with image management, but not with the use of privacy controls. 
This could be because individuals use image management as an internal privacy protection 












































controls to protect against external concerns. Surprisingly, and contrary to H13, offline network 
size had the opposite association. It was correlated negatively and significantly with privacy 
protection. Individuals with a greater network size were actually less likely to engage in stringent 
privacy protection offline.   
In all, there do not seem to be many significant predictors of Facebook privacy 
protection. The use of privacy controls is associated with Net Geners, females, and individuals 
who are more knowledgeable about privacy protection and more conscientious. Image 
management is correlated with Net Geners and individuals with a greater online network size. 
Friend selectivity is only related to greater family role heterogeneity.  
Also, the relationships between correlates and privacy protection, when compared online 
and offline, were not consistent. However, the overall direction of these relationships was the 
most consistent for offline privacy protection and Facebook privacy controls, even though 
greater conscientiousness was the only significant correlate for both indices. For friend 
selectivity, the overall direction of these relationships was less consistent with offline privacy 
protection, but both were positively associated with network size. Image management shared no 
significant correlates with offline privacy protection and the overall direction of these 
associations was inconsistent across the two indices. This implies that out of the three types of 
Facebook privacy protection, privacy controls are most comparable to offline privacy protection. 
However, the fact that online and offline privacy protection have such different correlates could 
also mean that online and offline privacy protection may not be as similar as was expected. In 





A Comparison of Offline and Online Privacy Protection 
 The second research question asked how similar offline privacy protection is to online 
privacy protection in order to answer the overarching question: Do people have a reasonable 
expectation to privacy on Facebook? Means were compared across offline and online privacy 
protection indices. Greater privacy protection was engaged in offline (Mean = .77) than on 
Facebook (Privacy Controls Mean = .68, Image Management Mean = .53, Friend Selectivity = 
.56) (See Figure 7).  A Paired Samples T-Test was performed and Facebook users were found to 
engage in significantly more stringent privacy protection offline than on Facebook at p=.00 (See 
Appendix K). 
 
Figure 7: A Comparison of Offline and Online Privacy Protection Means 
 
 
 However, just because respondents engaged in greater offline privacy protection does not 
mean that offline and online privacy protection is different. To gauge the similarity of offline and 


























































Facebook privacy protection indices: privacy controls, image management, friend selectivity 
(See Table 4).  
 
Table 4:  Correlation between Offline Privacy Protection and Facebook Privacy Protection 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   Offline Privacy Protection Index: 
        
    
Facebook Privacy Protection Indices:  
Privacy Controls                                                                               .19**                                         
Image Management                                                                         -.14**                                            
Friend Selectivity                                                                              .16**                                          
**correlation (r) is significant at p < .01.  
 
H14 predicted that individuals who engage in stringent offline privacy protection will 
also engage in stringent online privacy protection. Privacy controls and friend selectivity have 
low but significant and positive correlations with offline privacy protection. However, image 
management is significantly, negatively correlated with offline privacy protection. This means 
that, as predicted, individuals who use more stringent privacy controls and friend selectivity on 
Facebook, also engage in more stringent privacy protection offline. Individuals who use more 
stringent image management actually engage in less privacy protection offline.  
Next, a regression was performed to determine which variables moderate the relationship 
between the engagement in offline privacy protection and the use of privacy controls, image 
management, and friend selectivity. We can also see from these models if the correlations 
described in Table 4 still remain when controlling for a large number of predictors. The 
following variables were considered: demographic variables, personality variables, generational 
cohort. Role heterogeneity and network size were not incorporated. Since they were composed of 




comparison. Only variables such as demographics and personality that were the same offline and 
online were used.  
After controlling for alternative predicting variables, offline privacy protection only had a 
strong, positive, and significant correlation with Facebook privacy controls (See Table 5).  
Offline privacy protection had a moderate, positive correlation with friend selectivity but this 
was marginally significant. The relationship between image management and offline privacy 
protection was not significant. Therefore, those who engage in more stringent offline privacy 
protection also engage in more stringent online privacy protection for two out of the three types 
of online privacy protection studied. These regression findings are mostly consistent with the 
initial correlation findings except for the fact that the negative correlation between offline and 
privacy protection and image management is not significant. The possible differences between 
image management and the other two online privacy protections that might account for this 
inconsistency will be discussed later. 
Table 5 also shows generational cohort to be a moderating variable for each of the three 
online and offline privacy protection comparisons even when controlled for alternative 
predicting variables. A comparison of offline and online privacy protection means shows Baby 
Boomers to have the greatest difference and Net Geners to have the smallest between online and 
offline mean privacy protection; however, both of these differences were modest in size (See 
Figure 8).  With an Independent Samples T-Test, Baby Boomers were found to engage in 
significantly more stringent privacy protection offline than Net Geners at p=.00 (See Appendix 
L). As discussed previously, the use of Facebook privacy controls did not differ significantly 
between generations (See Appendix I).  Although Baby Boomers, on average, engage in more 




This suggests that Net Geners are more concerned about their online privacy than older 
generations. This may be because they reveal more personal information online than older 
generations.  
 




H15 predicted that older generations would engage in more comparable offline and 
online privacy protection than the Net Generation. An interaction was calculated to determine the 
distinct relationship between privacy protection and generational cohort (See Figure 9). Baby 
Boomers and Generation Xers were found to have a high, positive and significant interaction on 
the relationship between offline privacy protection and Facebook privacy controls.  H15 was 
confirmed. Baby Boomers have the largest positive correlation between offline and online 




















































Offline Privacy Protection 






Table 5: A Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Online and Offline Privacy Protection 








Offline Privacy Protection 0.23** -0.09 0.13
^
 
White 0.06 0.01 0.02 
Asian 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Black -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
Female 0.04* -0.01 0.01 
Agreeableness -0.01 -0.10 0.06 
Conscientiousness 0.14* 0.05 0.01 
Emotional Stability -0.10 -0.01 0.03 
Extraversion -0.04 0.07 0.07 
Openness 0.13
^
 -0.04 -0.07 
Income 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Current Education 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Generation Xers -0.02 -0.05* 0.05* 
Baby Boomers -0.06* -0.09** 0.07** 
N 339 363 360 
R
2
 .118 .123 .086 




Figure 9: The Relationship of Offline and Online Privacy Protection by Generational Cohort 
 
 
a significant correlation. Again, Generation Xers are found to be more similar than Baby 
Boomers to the online behavior of Net Geners. As predicted, offline and online privacy 
protection is more comparable for older generations than they are for younger generations. These 
generations are aligning their online privacy protection with their offline privacy protection. 
They may even be basing their online privacy protection off of their offline privacy protection. It 
should also be noted that Net Geners engage in more stringent privacy protection online 
regardless of the stringency of their offline privacy protections. This further confirms that Net 
Geners are more concerned about online privacy. For image management and friend selectivity, 
Baby Boomers and Generation Xers were also found to have interactions in the same direction, 
but with no significance.   
My thesis has a causal hypothesis that offline behavioral norms influence the creation of 


















































may be another causal story. Online norms may actually influence offline norms. However, it 
makes the most logical sense to describe offline behavior as influencing online behavior. Since 
offline behaviors are learned before online behaviors, offline behavioral norms most likely 
developed before online norms- especially for the older generations who did not grow up with 
the Internet. This finding, regardless of the relationship’s direction, has significant implications 
for the central question of the research: Do Facebook users have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy?  
 
Table 6: A Summary Hypotheses and Findings 
 
H1 Confirmed Net Geners engage in greater self-revelation online than older 
generations.  
H2 Confirmed Net Geners have more comparable offline and online self-
revelation than older generations. 
H3 Rejected Net Geners engage in more stringent privacy protection online 
(privacy controls and image management) than older generations.  
H4 Partially confirmed Females use more stringent privacy controls but do not engage in 
more stringent image management or friend selectivity.  
H5 Confirmed Privacy controls knowledge is associated with a more stringent use 
of privacy controls.  
H6 Rejected Agreeableness is not a predictor of Facebook privacy protection.  
H7 Partially confirmed Higher conscientiousness is associated with more stringent privacy 
controls but not image management and friend selectivity.  
H8 Rejected Openness is not a predictor of Facebook privacy protection. 
H9 Rejected Extraversion is not a predictor of Facebook privacy protection. 
H10 Rejected Role heterogeneity is not a predictor of Facebook privacy controls 
or image management. 
H11 Rejected Role heterogeneity is not a predictor of online or offline privacy 
protection.  
H12 Partially confirmed Greater network size is associated with more stringent image 
management but not privacy controls. 
H13 Rejected Network size has a positive association with online privacy 
protection, but a negative association with offline privacy 
protection.  
H14 Partially confirmed Privacy controls and friend selectivity are positively correlated 
with offline privacy protection. Image management is negatively 
correlated with offline privacy protection. 
H15 Confirmed Offline and online privacy protection is more comparable for older 





Do Facebook users exhibit an expectation to privacy? 
The data were analyzed to ultimately determine the answer to the question: Do social 
media users have a reasonable expectation of privacy? Based on Katz v. United States (1967), the 
legal definition of privacy involves two criteria. First, an individual must exhibit an actual 
expectation of privacy. Secondly, society must acknowledge this expectation as reasonable, 389 
U.S. 361.  My study focused on Facebook as one example of online social media, but I believe 
the insights I draw from this particular site can be applied to other social media sites that involve 
the sharing of personal information.  
In order for Facebook users to meet the first criterion- that individuals expect their self-
revelation to be private- they must behave in a way that displays this expectation. One way of 
determining this is by comparing offline privacy protection based on the Supreme Court example 
in Katz of shutting the door to a public telephone booth with privacy protection used on 
Facebook. I believe that the overall pattern of results from my survey of 381 adults around the 
country suggest that the first criterion has been met. In this section, I will also discuss 
commentary provided by 10 Facebook users with whom I conducted in-depth interviews. The 
names of these individuals were changed to protect their identity. Although these comments are 
not representative of Facebook users as a whole, the insights of actual Facebook users, in 
addition to my already established hypotheses, play an important role in interpreting and 
explaining the Facebook behavioral tendencies found in my data analysis. 
Results show that Facebook users act in ways that are consistent with the notion that they 
consider their online communication to be private. First, Facebook users engage in online 
privacy protection that is similar to offline privacy protection. Out of the three types of online 




offline privacy protection such as refraining from talking about excessive drinking or sexual 
experiences in public, even after the relationship was controlled for other possible predicting 
variables. Not only is the use of Facebook privacy controls most strongly correlated with online 
privacy protection, these two behaviors were also the most similar in terms of the overall 
direction and size of the correlates. However, the only correlate with a significant effect was the 
personality variable conscientiousness.  
The use of privacy controls on Facebook is very similar to the Katz example of “shutting 
the telephone booth door,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 352, (1967). By using privacy 
controls, Facebook users are drawing a privacy boundary on Facebook. Information that is 
limited to only Facebook friends is more private than information that is viewable to all Internet 
users. Facebook users, regardless of generational cohort, were found on average to use the 
“Friend” privacy control to restrict their content from public view. Hiding Facebook content 
behind a protective cyberwall is analogous to concealing a private telephone conversation behind 
a telephone booth wall. As legal scholar, Semitsu had argued, the courts should imagine the use 
of Facebook privacy settings as the “twenty-first century equivalent of a phone booth” (Semitsu, 
2011, p. 369). My results suggest this is exactly how users apply and even think of these features 
on the social media sites. 
In open-ended conversations, Facebook users discussed their expectation that privacy 
controls on Facebook should be respected. “My content is more private than a person’s who has 
their settings set to public,” said Lucy, age 19. When asked how he would react if someone were 
to find a way to get past his privacy settings without his knowledge or consent, George, age 22 




content and the people you don’t want. If [others] don’t respect that barrier, then it’s a privacy 
invasion.”  
Friend selectivity is, to a lesser extent, correlated with the use of offline privacy 
protection such as refraining from criticizing a professor or employer in public. This effect 
remained even after controlling for other variables that might be responsible for the relationship. 
An individual who is more selective about Facebook friends will have a more private audience 
for his or her online content. Preventing unwanted audiences from viewing content on Facebook 
is also similar to shutting a telephone booth door in order to prevent unwanted audiences from 
overhearing a private telephone conversation. Like privacy controls, friend selectivity can be 
seen as a second online equivalent to shutting the telephone booth door. Privacy controls and 
friend selectivity are actually very similar behaviors- they both allow a user to control who views 
their content.  
However, friend selectivity was correlated to a lesser extent than privacy controls with 
offline privacy protection. This finding, while not predicted, is not unexpected. It was found that 
privacy controls are the most commonly used privacy protection across generations. Privacy 
controls are the only privacy protection that is actually created, explained, and promoted by 
Facebook.  Friend selectivity is a user-initiated behavior which serves as an additional privacy 
safeguard. Another explanation is that the friend selectivity index was the least reliable index and 
was only marginally reliable.
8
 In conclusion, both of the variables do appear to guarantee an 
expectation of privacy on Facebook. This suggests that people may rely on offline expectations 
of privacy to determine their online behaviors. This is a clear indication that social media users 
exhibit an expectation of privacy online. 
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It was also found that individuals who engage in more stringent image management 
actually employ less stringent privacy protection offline. This negative relationship was not 
significant when other predictors were controlled. While this finding was unexpected, there are a 
few reasons why image management is distinguishable from privacy controls and friend 
selectivity. One difference is that privacy controls and friend selectivity are behaviors that block 
audiences from content while image management limits available content to those who already 
have access. Offline privacy protection was created to include both limiting content and blocking 
audiences.  
Upon later reflection, image management may not actually be a privacy protection, but a 
limit on self-revelation. Deleting and refraining from posting certain content is more about 
limiting the private information you share rather than limiting who is able to see that private 
information. One explanation of why image management is negatively related to offline privacy 
protection is that individuals who use greater image management might share less inappropriate 
content on Facebook in the first place because they are more private individuals. This was found 
not to be the case, because image management is positively and significantly correlated with 
Facebook self-revelation.
9
 Facebook users who are more likely to delete inappropriate pictures or 
postings are also more likely to post inappropriate content on Facebook. This finding further 
supports the fact that image management may be more related to self-revelation than privacy 
protection.  
Do Facebook users have a reasonable expectation to privacy? 
Although engaging in privacy controls and friend selectivity does exhibit a privacy 
expectation on Facebook, it has still not been determined yet whether or not this expectation is 
reasonable. This criterion is determined by the prevailing standards in society. However, the 
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answer to this question is complicated because the Katz test assumes that privacy expectations 
are well-developed and stable, and new technologies can put these expectations in flux, United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. _____, (2012). One way of measuring society’s standard is to discover 
whether certain groups of Facebook users are less likely to reveal information and to use privacy 
protection online. These groups are more likely to see a difference between cyberspace and 
offline and less likely to feel that Facebook behaviors afford the same protections as offline 
behaviors. Thus, these groups are less likely to acknowledge this expectation of privacy on 
Facebook as reasonable. My results suggest that certain groups of Facebook users do differ in 
their behavior on Facebook. A deeper analysis can determine why these groups of Facebook 
users are more or less likely to agree that social media users have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
Self-Revelation 
 In general, Facebook users were found to reveal less information online than offline. This 
finding suggests that Facebook users are concerned that Facebook conversations are less private 
than an offline conversation, and thus, are more cautious with what they reveal. While all 
generations revealed less personal information on Facebook than offline, Baby Boomers revealed 
the least amount of inappropriate information on Facebook. Some Baby Boomers are more 
cautious. “I’m not 100% confident that my privacy settings can keep out unwanted onlookers- 
people can always figure out how to work a system. It makes me more cautious about what 
information I share,” said Joyce, a 42-year-old participant. Others don’t understand why some 
people enjoy sharing personal information online: “I find it odd when people share information 
about what they are doing. First of all, why would anyone else care, and second, who would 




lack experience with the site. “I don’t really put anything on Facebook. I use Facebook more to 
look at other peoples’ stuff,” Bruce added.  
On the other hand, younger generations identify more benefits in sharing private 
information online (Debatin et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2007).  Beth, age 18, sees Facebook as an 
opportunity to connect with friends she no longer sees as often: “I want to give off a good 
impression of my college experience to friends back home.” Facebook can also help promote a 
certain image which some users feel pressured to maintain. “You don’t want to seem like a bore 
on Facebook,” George, age 22, explained about why he sometimes posts inappropriate 
information. However, it seems that even for the Net Generation there are limits to what is 
appropriate to post on Facebook because of concerns about the consequences of revealing too 
much personal information online (Benson, 2009). “I personally don’t post pictures suggesting 
alcohol use or drug use or any sexual innuendo. To a lesser extent, bad language is also not 
appropriate,” said George. Christina, age 20, also warned about taking pictures holding a red 
cup- a symbol of drinking among the Net Generation. “The red cup- that’s like a classic nono. 
Even if it’s just water, don’t have a red cup,” she advised.  
Younger generation, lower income and education, greater network size, and extraversion 
were all positively associated with greater self-revelation only on Facebook. These 
characteristics appear to fall into two groups: extraversion and generational cohort. Extraverted 
individuals are more likely to take risks and share information (Junglas et al., 2008) and will 
logically have a larger social network on Facebook. The second category, generational cohort, 
encompasses both income and education because respondents in the youngest generational 
cohort had the lowest income and current education levels. Two characteristics of Net Geners, 




Geners may reveal more because they are younger and more immature. These individuals may 
think less about the consequences of revealing personal information online than older 
generations. Net Geners, having lower income and education levels, are also less likely to have a 
professional image to maintain and therefore are less vulnerable.  
While role heterogeneity was predicted to influence privacy protection, it actually 
appears to play a greater role in self-revelation. For instance, it was found that individuals with 
more family members on Facebook are less likely to reveal personal information on Facebook. 
Individuals with a higher current education were found to have a greater number of employers 
and teachers as Facebook friends. These individuals, more likely to be part of an older 
generation, may feel that their Facebook friends would judge them more harshly for revealing 
inappropriate information and may be more worried about potential negative consequences in 
their professional life. “When I was a freshman in college, I didn’t have to worry about applying 
to jobs or school. Due to a combination of both immaturity and also being in less professional 
situations, I was less guarded than I am now on Facebook and Twitter,” explains George, age 22. 
This is also supported by the fact that those with a higher current education level use more 
stringent privacy controls. However, role heterogeneity could also be an effect of self-revelation 
rather than a cause. Users who reveal less on Facebook may be more comfortable with having a 
more heterogeneous network on Facebook. The association of greater self-revelation with lower 
income and education level could also be the result of a cultural difference, based on socio-
economic status, rather than one based on maturity and vulnerability. A future study could 
attempt to explain this difference in self-revelation online. 
One unexpected finding was that highly conscientious individuals have high self-




others may do with this information (Junglas et al., 2008). However, sharing information is only 
half of the process. Facebook users can also limit unwanted access to private information by 
engaging in privacy protection.  It may be that while conscientious individuals share more, they 
also more carefully control who has access to that information. Indeed, in this study, 
conscientiousness was found to predict the use of privacy controls.  
Not only do Net Geners reveal more online, but they are also more consistent with what 
they share online and offline compared to older generations, confirming Benson’s findings 
(2009).  Net Geners do not seem to distinguish between cyberspace and offline when it comes to 
sharing information. “Some of my friends treat Facebook as a diary,” said Jeremy aged 19. In 
fact, it is possible that Net Geners view social media as an online reflection of their offline 
world. Beth, age 18, feels pressure to keep her Facebook image consistent with her offline 
image. “I feel like I have to have up-to-date profile pictures. I can’t use a picture from last year 
because then it will be like something’s wrong with me now and I don’t want to be seen,” she 
said.  
For Baby Boomers, online and offline self-revelation is not similar. Baby Boomers who 
are more self-revelatory offline are actually less self-revelatory online.  Cyberspace is not a 
reflection of offline life. Baby Boomers treat cyberspace differently- they see self-revelation 
offline and online as distinct phenomena. This further implies why they are more cautious than 
the Net Generation in revealing information online.  
Privacy Protection 
While it was predicted that Net Geners would engage in less privacy protection on 
Facebook, it was actually found that older generations, as a whole, use less stringent privacy 




these individuals may engage in less stringent privacy protection because they have less 
information to hide.  “I’m not concerned about who can see my profile because I put very little 
information out there- only things that I would be comfortable showing anybody,” explained 
Bruce aged 50.  Because they have less to hide, their concern for protecting their Facebook 
content is also lessened. “Newspaper reporters, my mothers, and nosy neighbors are more of a 
concern to me than a privacy invasion on Facebook” said Hilary aged 50.   
While Net Geners use more stringent privacy controls in general, the average Facebook 
user, regardless of generational cohort, was found to use the “Friend” privacy control. The 
“Friend” setting allows only Facebook friends to access Facebook content. Thus, on average, 
Facebook users privatize their content. Net Geners are more likely to use the “Custom” setting 
which is a more stringent control because it limits content to specific Facebook friends. Why are 
Net Geners more likely to take this extra step to protect their privacy?  
One explanation is that Net Geners are more concerned about their online privacy than 
older generations. Indeed, this was found to be this case. Net Geners, who reveal more personal 
information online, have a reason to be more concerned about their privacy. Net Geners also use 
more stringent image management on Facebook than older generations. Older generations do not 
have the same need to manage their online image because they don’t reveal personal information 
that would be considered inappropriate in the first place. Since Net Geners have decided to 
reveal more inappropriate information online, they have a greater need to manage their image. 
Another explanation is that Net Geners are more knowledgeable about privacy settings 
and are therefore savvier users of “Custom” controls than older generations. I also found 
evidence for this in the current study. Further supporting this claim, I found that out of the three 




Joyce, age 42 explained, “I don’t take the time to learn about privacy controls because I don’t 
share information that I’m that concerned about protecting.”  On the other hand, all Net Geners 
interviewed could name their privacy settings when asked and could even describe a specific 
reason for choosing this privacy setting. Younger Facebook users are more knowledgeable about 
and take greater advantage of Facebook’s most stringent privacy settings. Christina, age 20, 
explained, “I use the custom privacy setting a lot because some of my Facebook friends are 
family members or [University] faculty. If I’m using profanity or something I don’t want my 
daddy to see, I make sure to customize him out.” While an older user may simply decide not to 
use profanity, the Net Generation privatizes it using Facebook privacy controls. 
Personality variables were not found to have a significant effect on the use of Facebook 
privacy protection. Jungals et al. (2008) did find more conscientious individuals and individuals 
more open to experience to have more online privacy concerns; however, only conscientiousness 
was found to predict more stringent use of privacy controls.  Junglas et al. (2008) also found that 
less agreeable and more open individuals have more online privacy concerns (Junglas et al., 
2008), but I found no evidence for these relationships in the current study. It could be that for 
agreeable and open individuals, concern for online privacy does not actually influence privacy 
protection. Or, these individuals could find ways other than altering their online behavior to 
minimize their privacy concerns and risks. For instance, individuals low on agreeableness and 
high on openness were found in this study to engage in less self-revelation on Facebook.
10
 
Instead of using privacy controls to minimize who has access to their content, they might instead 
refrain from posting inappropriate content in the first place. However, both the agreeableness and 
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openness to experience indices had a low Cronbrach’s Alpha. Even though a well tested measure 
was used, these findings are less reliable.
11
   
 Role heterogeneity also had barely any significant influence on the use of online and 
offline privacy protection. Based on Goffman’s theory on front stage and backstage (1959), this 
finding was also unexpected. This may be due to an invalid measure of network heterogeneity. I 
compared a ratio of Facebook friends in each “front stage” group with a report on how often an 
individual finds himself or herself in an offline situation where both front stage and backstage 
audiences are present. However, one explanation is that role heterogeneity is more related to self-
revelation than privacy protection. Individuals with greater role heterogeneity shared less 
personal information on Facebook because they were more concerned with the negative 
consequences on their professional life. But, it cannot be determined from this research if greater 
role heterogeneity causes less self-revelation or if it is an effect. It may be that individuals who 
reveal less on Facebook may be more comfortable with accepting Facebook friends that are 
family members, teachers or employers.  
Network size unexpectedly had an opposite effect online than it did offline. Online, 
greater network size predicted more stringent privacy protection. This may occur because 
Facebook users with a larger social network feel a greater need to protect their content. Or, the 
reverse could be true. Those who engage in more stringent privacy protection may feel more 
comfortable engaging in greater self-revelation regardless of network size. Like role 
heterogeneity, network size may actually be a consequence rather than a cause of privacy 
protection. Offline, an individual with greater network size engaged in less stringent privacy 
protection. It is possible that, offline, individuals who value privacy more highly will have fewer 
friends and reveal less information will not need to engage in privacy protection. In contrast, 
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individuals who have more friends may be less private and may feel comfortable revealing 
personal information to more people. Rather than network size influencing privacy protection, it 
could actually be a personality trait such as extraversion or openness which influences both 




In conclusion, it appears that a privacy boundary has been established on Facebook 
across all generational cohorts. However, older generations, in general, have different behaviors 
on Facebook than Net Geners. Baby Boomers, as a whole, are less self-revelatory and engage is 
less stringent privacy protection online. Their remedy to privacy risk is not the use of privacy 
controls, but the decision to not post inappropriate content.  Is this because Baby Boomers are 
not as familiar with social media technology, in particular, privacy settings? Or, because they 
believe that there is no expectation of privacy online?  
Baby Boomers have less experience on social media and are therefore less 
knowledgeable about sharing and privatizing content. Since Baby Boomers reveal less 
information online, they may have less of a concern about online privacy and may spend less 
time learning about privacy settings.  Baby Boomers are much less likely than younger 
generations to use the "Custom" privacy control which is more difficult to manage and also more 
time consuming to use than the “Friend” privacy setting. Net Geners, who are more likely to use 
the “Custom” control, have more of an incentive to master the use of this control because they 
reveal more inappropriate information online.  
Another explanation is that Baby Boomers are hesitant to conform to the behavioral 
norms that have been established by Net Geners online. Net Geners, who use more stringent 
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privacy controls regardless of their offline behavior, have adapted a behavioral standard online 
for privacy protection. However, older generations, having less experience online, have not 
adopted this same standard. Rather, their offline privacy protection is strongly correlated with 
their online privacy protection. Older generations are applying offline privacy norms as they 
navigate privacy boundaries in cyberspace rather than taking cues from the Net Geners. Net 
Geners also engage in greater self-revelation online and are more consistent in their self-
revelation from online to offline than Baby Boomers. Again, this implies that Baby Boomers are 
hesitant to adopt the online behavioral norms of Net Geners when it comes to sharing and 
privatizing information online.  If this is true, Baby Boomers may be less likely to see these 
behaviors as guaranteeing a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
While online behaviors do differ across generations and attitudes about online privacy 
concern are currently in flux, it can be predicted that the online behavior of Net Geners will 
eventually become the norm. Generation X is a generation in transition. This generation’s self-
revelation and privacy protection fall in between that of Net Geners and Baby Boomers. 
Generation Xers were found to use slightly more privacy controls than Baby Boomers and to be 
slightly more self-revelatory than Baby Boomers. As Tapscott (2009) predicted, Generation Xers 
are most similar to the Net Generation when it comes to online behavior. This is evidence that 
although the behaviors of Net Geners are currently seen as normatively different from older 
generations, as the cohorts continue to age, the Internet behaviors of Net Geners may become the 
norm.   
Since generational cohort has proven to have such an important influence on both the use 
of self-revelation and privacy protection, it is difficult to say that all generations will currently 




to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy because these individuals use Facebook so 
differently than younger generations. “Facebook is free. Facebook is a business. I use Facebook, 
but I keep these two things in mind always,” said Hilary, age 50. However, not all Baby 
Boomers are as skeptical about an expectation of privacy on Facebook. Bruce, age 50, feels that 
“if its password protected and if you’ve got the right security controls, then it should be 
considered private regardless of the media used.”  
It appears that a privacy boundary has been negotiated online. The “Friend” privacy 
control, used by all generations, restricts Facebook content from the public view. Although 
society may have not reached a definitive consensus on whether or not this affords a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, an agreement is in progress as demonstrated by the Generation X’s role 
as a transitional generation. Thus, the question remains, is the difference in behavior due to older 
generations’ lack of experience with and comfort with social media? Or is it due to a belief that 
cyberspace does not afford the same expectations of privacy as offline? Once older generations 
have had more experience with social media, and the Net Generation ages and becomes a larger 
part of the citizenry, we will have a better sense of whether or not Katz should be expanded to 
include social media sites and the Internet. 
The Role of Legislative Bodies 
 “The Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a 
well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations…dramatic technological change may lead 
to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant 
changes in popular attitudes,” writes Justice Alito, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. _____, 
(2012), (p. 10). According to Alito, the Katz test should be applied to a society that has a “well-




self-revelation on the Internet and changed expectations of privacy online.  It will take time for 
these privacy expectations to develop and stabilize. Since the development of these social media 
is so recent, older generational cohorts, having less experience with the technology, may not 
have been able to develop a consistent popular attitude towards Facebook privacy boundaries. 
Until it is determined why older generations engage in less stringent privacy protection, it 
may not be the place for the courts to draw this online privacy boundary using the Katz test. 
Prematurely interpreting a societal attitude in a major court ruling about online privacy would 
most likely be viewed as judicial activism which occurs when judges allow their personal views 
about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions.  However, the courts are not 
the only possible actor in this scenario. Opponents of this judicial philosophy encourage the 
courts to wait for policy makers to draft legislation that best targets society’s concerns. “In 
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns 
may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw 
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way,” writes Justice 
Alito is in his opinion, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. _____, (2012), (p. 13).  
While it is important to determine a Facebook users’ expectation of privacy, it is also 
important to acknowledge the groups on Facebook, such as older generational cohorts, who may 
disagree with this determination. Because there are significant differences in Facebook behavior 
across Facebook user generations, it is difficult to currently label this reasonable expectation of 
privacy as “well-developed and stable” until it is better understood why these groups differ.  
However, based on these findings, it can be assumed that the “Friend” privacy control setting is a 




suggested, legislators may need to step in and define privacy boundaries online along this 
already established privacy boundary for those who need and expect it most. 
Summary of Limitations and Further Research 
While these results suggest that a general consensus about privacy expectations online 
has yet to coalesce, several limitations in the current study would need to be addressed before 
recommending legal or legislative policy action. A large sample was used, but it was not a 
representative one. The results found in this study can hint at the general behavior Facebook 
users, but it cannot be assumed that these results will apply to all Americans. Another limit of 
survey research is that while a causal direction was implied, we cannot be certain about the 
causal antecedents of online privacy protection. It is a logical assumption to make that since 
offline behaviors are learned before online behaviors, a user may simply apply their offline 
privacy standards to their behavior in cyberspace. However, the direction of this relationship 
may actually be reversed for many citizens, especially those in younger generations who are 
learning norms of social interaction online before adulthood. Further research on this question 
could attempt to definitively determine the directionality of this relationship. But, for legal 
purposes, it is enough to say that these offline and online privacy protections are similar in order 
to afford the same protection offline and online.  
Another limitation is that new measures were used. Although for the most part reliable,
13
 
these measures may not be valid. I attempted to analogize interactions and behaviors on 
cyberspace with offline interactions and behaviors. Since the development of the Internet, 
Supreme Court justices and legal scholars have attempted to create these analogies in order to 
determine how law should apply to cyberspace. However, there are inherent differences between 
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cyberspace and offline that make it very difficult to develop these analogies. As discussed in the 
methods section, I attempted to make logical analogies between online and offline behaviors, 
but, these are not the only online and offline analogies possible. Further research could be 
conducted using different analogies in an attempt to find the most valid measure of behaviors 
both offline and on Facebook. It must also be asked whether or not these online analogies apply 
to other social media sites such as Twitter, Linked In, and Myspace. Privacy controls are 
common to each of these social media technologies, but further research could show if friend 
selectivity and image management are also used, and if privacy controls are used to the same 
extent across all social media sites. 
This research also mostly dealt with the Fourth Amendment and possible online privacy 
invasions by law enforcement, employers, and school officials. These privacy risks were based 
on revealing information that these groups deem inappropriate or illegal. However, there are also 
other types of privacy risks on Facebook. For example, publishing personal information such as 
an address, phone number, credit card, or social security number online can have its own risks 
related to safety and identity theft.  Lucy, age 19, uses privacy settings because “there are a lot of 
crazy people out there. I want to feel safe.” Other groups can also be seen as invasive. 
Commercial organizations use data mining of Facebook and other social media sites to provide 
information about consumer interests and preferences. Previous research has already dealt with 
some of these questions, but it is important to better understand the attitudes and behaviors of 
Facebook users regarding these types of privacy risks in order to determine whether or not more 







The development of social media, which encourages the sharing of personal information, 
has created serious privacy risks for Internet users. While social media usage is inherently social, 
many users still consider their shared content to be private. In other words, social media users 
have negotiated a privacy boundary on the Internet. The “Friend” privacy control on Facebook, 
which limits content from public view, is the most consistently applied privacy setting across 
generations. Information that is protected by privacy settings developed by social media sites is 
considered to be more private than information that is not. However, this sense of privacy, if not 
legally recognized, may not be realized. Even though social media users take similar steps online 
and offline to protect their privacy, current privacy law does not afford these individuals with an 
expectation of privacy in cyberspace. I hope that this research will contribute to the development 
of a new “Katz” standard that protects privacy both online and offline.  
The courts, using the current Katz test, may be hesitant to rule that social media users 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy online based on the fact that generational cohorts differ 
so significantly in their behaviors on social media sites.  Further research can determine if these 
behaviors differ because of a lack of knowledge or experience with the site, or if older 
generations simply believe that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy online. However, it 
is unrealistic that social media users must wait for their established privacy boundary to be 
legally confirmed by Supreme Court until an indefinite point in the future. Not only must a case 
about social media privacy invasion reach the Supreme Court, but society’s consensus regarding 
a reasonable expectation of privacy on social media must also be better understood. Until then, 
social media users, 50% of all Americans according to study by the Pew Research Center, will 




online privacy at risk is unacceptable. Thus, legislators must take action in order to protect this 
established online privacy boundary, and quickly.  
Legislation should be passed to afford social media users the same legal protections that 
are guaranteed offline. While private information may be confiscated offline via a court-ordered 
warrant or subpoena, an individual must have notice and knowledge of this access. Privacy law 
should also limit the unauthorized access of social media content without a social media user’s 
knowledge or consent. The Federal Trade Commission recently worked with Facebook to update 
its privacy policy to limit Facebook’s ability to override its users’ privacy settings (Sengupta, 
2011). Legislators should expand this policy to restrict any individual from overriding a user’s 
privacy settings without a court-issued warrant or subpoena. Facebook has recently released 
statements warning employers against accessing a job applicant’s private content because it 
violates a user’s privacy (Duncan, 2012). Policy makers should take a similar stance and also 
restrict employers, law enforcement, and other individuals from violating a social media user’s 
expectation of privacy by accessing private content without his or her knowledge or consent. 
Legislators can also update the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, a 
legislative initiative that was passed to limit the ability of third-party Internet service providers to 
reveal information to the government and non-government entities, in order to better protect 
privacy on social media sites. District court Judge Morrow ruled that social media messages and 
privatized wall posts were subject to the SCA in Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc, 717 F. Supp. 
2d 991 (2010). In line with this ruling, legislators can expand the SCA to protect wall posts, 
messages and other content on social media such as photo-sharing and event-creating that are 
privatized (Semitsu, 2011). Limiting the voluntary disclosure abilities of third parties would also 




which limited the ability of Internet service providers to turn over the content of a user’s emails 
without his or her knowledge. While the SCA only currently protects electronic communications 
that have been in storage for less than 180 days, the SCA could also be expanded to require that 
all private online communication, regardless of how old it is, must require user-notice before it is 
accessed. It is not likely that Facebook users feel that their older content on Facebook is less 
private than newer posts.  
These changes would not make it impossible to access information that has been 
privatized on social media sites, but would instead limit the access of private information in 
cyberspace to the rules of offline privacy law. While some may argue that social media users 
should simply reveal less information online, this argument does not take into account changing 
behavioral norms. Online behavioral norms are currently in transition. As the Net Generation 
ages, its online behaviors will become the norm. Instead of attempting to change behavioral 
norms on the Internet, legislators should work to protect and more concretely define the already 
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Appendix A: Demographics of Mechanical Turk Sample  
 
Current/Highest Level of Education Received 
 
Completed High School                                            14% 
Currently Enrolled at a 2 year college                     4% 
Currently enrolled at a 4 year college                                17% 
Completed a 2 or 4 year college degree                    38% 
Currently pursuing/Completed a higher degree                 26% 
 
If currently enrolled in a 4 year college, what grade? 
 
Freshmen                  16% 
Sophomore                  19% 
Junior                              24% 




White, Hispanic origin                           16% 
White, Non-Hispanic origin                           49% 
American Indian or Alaska Native                3% 
Asian or Pacific Islander                           25% 




Less than $19,999                          30% 
$20,000-$49,999                          33% 
$50,000-$99,999                          20% 





Appendix B: Demographics of College Sample  
 
Age 
18                 27% 
19                 43% 
20                 7% 
21                 12% 
22                 12% 
 
Grade Level 
Freshmen                         53% 
Sophomore                         23% 
Junior                                      7% 
Senior                                     17% 
 
Race 
White, Hispanic origin                            15% 
White, Non-Hispanic origin                            65% 
American Indian or Alaska Native                10% 
Asian or Pacific Islander                             8% 











Appendix C: Comparison between Mechanical Turk and College Sample 
 
Correlation between Offline and Online Self-Revelation  
Mechanical Turk Net Generation Sample 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   Offline Self-Revelation: 
        
    
Facebook Self-Revelation:  
                                                                                                     .48**                                          
**correlation (r) is significant at p < .01.  
College Sample 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   Offline Self-Revelation: 
        
    
Facebook Self-Revelation:  
                                                                                                     .59**                                          
**correlation (r) is significant at p < .01.  
 
Correlation between Offline and Online Privacy Protection  
Mechanical Turk Net Generation Sample 
                                                                                    
                                                                                         Offline Privacy Protection: 
        
    
Facebook Privacy Protection Indices:  
Privacy Controls                                                                               .07                                         
Image Management                                                                         -.13                                            
Friend Selectivity                                                                             .06                                         
**correlation (r) is significant at p < .01.  
College Sample 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   Offline Privacy Protection: 
        
    
Facebook Privacy Protection Indices:  
Privacy Controls                                                                               -.00                                         
Image Management                                                                          -.12                                            
Friend Selectivity                                                                              .03                                         






Appendix D: Index Measures 
Offline Self-Revelation Index (6 items, 4 answer choices for each) 
How often do you engage in each of the following activities?  
For each action, chose one of the following:  
(Often, occasionally, sometimes, never) 
1. I talk about drug use with my friends.  
2. I talk about excessive drinking with my friends. 
3. I talk about sexual experiences with my friends. 
4. I wear revealing clothing when I go out to a party or bar with my friends. 
5. I talk negatively about class or a teacher with my friends.  
6. I use swear words when I talk to my friends.  
 
Facebook Self-Revelation Index (9 questions, 4 answer choices for each) 
How often do you engage in each of the following activities on Facebook?  
 
For each action, chose one of the following:  
 
(Often, occasionally, sometimes, never) 
1. Use swear words in a comment or status. 
2. Talk about sexual experiences in a comment or status.  
3. Post or am tagged in photos wearing revealing clothing. 
a. Have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture? (yes/no) 
4. Post or am tagged in photos holding red cups or bottles of beer, wine, or alcohol.  
a. Have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture? (yes/no) 
5. Criticize a class, professor or a GSI in a comment or status. 
6. Criticize an employer or workplace in a negative way in a comment or status.  
7. Talk about excessive drinking in a comment or status.  
8. Post or am tagged in photos where I am making out with a friend or significant other.  
a. Have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture? (yes/no) 
9. Post or am tagged in photos using drugs. 








Facebook Privacy Protection Indices 
Privacy Control Index (3 items)  














Image Management Index (3 items)  
How often do you engage in each of the following behaviors?  
For each behavior, chose one of the following answer choices:  
(Often, occasionally, sometimes, never) 
1. Untag photos of yourself that you feel are inappropriate?  
2. Refrain from positing a status or comment that you felt would be inappropriate?  
3. Delete comments a friend made on your wall because you thought it was inappropriate? 
 
Friend Selectivity Index (2 items) 
1. Who would you accept as a friend?  
Anybody 
Anybody who attends my school 
Friends of friends 
People I have met before 
Only very close friends and family 
Only family 
Only close friends 
 







Not too well 
Not well at all 
Offline Privacy Protection Index (8 items) 
How often do you engage in each of the following activities?  
 
For each behavior, chose one of the following answer choices:  
 
(Often, occasionally, sometimes, never) 
1. Refrain from talking about excessive drinking on the phone, unless I am in a private 
space such as my room, my house, or my car. 
2. Use swear words in a public setting where others could possibly overhear. (R) 
3. Wear somewhat revealing clothing to work or a job interview. (R) 
4. Refrain from talking about sexual experiences on the phone, unless I am in a private 
space such as my room, my house, or my car. 
5. Kiss someone in public. (R) 
6. Talk on the phone about excessive drinking when I am in front of my parents. (R) 
7. Refrain from talking about drug use, unless I am in a private space such as my room, my 
house, or my car.  
8. Criticize a class or a teacher in a public setting where others could possibly overhear. (R) 
 
Privacy Controls Knowledge (5 items) 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
 (Strongly agree, agree, don’t know, disagree, strongly disagree) 
 
1. I am unfamiliar with Facebook’s privacy settings. (R) 
2. I feel comfortable using Facebook’s privacy settings.  
3. I am unsure of how protective my current privacy settings are. (R) 
4. I was aware when Facebook updated its privacy controls in September of 2011.  
 
5. When do you last adjust your privacy settings? 
In the last month 
In the last 3 months 
In the last 6 months 
In the last year 
In the last two years 










Big Five Personality Ten-Item Index 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 




1. I see myself as sympathetic/warm 
2. I see myself as critical/quarrelsome(R) 
Conscientiousness 
1. I see myself as dependable/self-disciplined 
2. I see myself as disorganized/careless (R) 
Emotional stability 
1. I see myself as calm/emotionally stable 
2. I see myself as anxious/easily upset (R) 
Extraversion 
1. I see myself as extraverted/enthusiastic 
2. I see myself as reserved/quiet (R) 
Openness to new experience 
1. I see myself as open to new experiences/complex 

















Appendix E: Complete Survey for College Sample 



















4. What is your race? 
 White, Hispanic origin 
 White, Non-Hispanic origin 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 
 Black or African American 
 Other  
 




6. How long have you had your Facebook account?  
 6 months 
 1 year 
 2 years 
 3 years 








7. How often do you check your account? 
 Less than a few times per month,  
 A few times per month 
 A few times per week 
 Daily 
 More than 3 times per day 
 More than 5 times per day 
 
 
8. On average, how much time do you spend on Facebook each time you check your 
account?  
 Up to 5 minutes 
 15 minutes 
 30 minutes 
 1 hour 
 More than 1 hour 
 
9. About how many Facebook friends do you have? ____ 
10. How many of your Facebook friends would you consider to be close friends? _____ 
11. About how many friends do you hang out with or see on a regular basis? _____ 
12. Who would you accept as a friend?  
 Anybody 
 Anybody in the University of Michigan network 
 Friends of friends 
 People you I have met 
 Only very close friends and family 
 Only family 
13. How well do you have to know someone before you will accept them as a friend on 
Facebook?  
 Extremely well 
 Very well 
 Somewhat well 
 Not too well 








How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
 (Strongly agree, agree, don’t know, disagree, strongly disagree) 
 
 
13. I am unfamiliar with Facebook’s privacy settings.  
14. I feel comfortable using Facebook’s privacy settings.  
15. I am unsure of how protective my current privacy settings are.  
16. I was aware when Facebook updated its privacy controls in September of 2011.  
 
 
17. When do you last adjust your privacy settings? 
In the last month 
In the last 3 months 
In the last 6 months 
In the last year 
In the last two years 
In the last three or more years 
 
 
About how many of your Facebook friends fall into each one of these groups? 
18. Family members  ______ 
19. Past or current employers _____ 
20. People under 18 _____ 
21. Past or current teachers or GSIs _____ 
22. What is your default privacy setting?  
 Public 
 Friends only 
 Custom  
 Don’t know 
 
a. If Custom setting: Which of the following groups do you show your content. 
Check all that apply. 






 Past or current employers 
 People under 18 
 Past or current teachers or GSIs 
 
 
23. What is your typical privacy setting for photos?  
 Public 
 Friends only 
 Custom 
 Don’t know 
 
a. If Custom setting: Which of the following groups do you show your content. 
Check all that apply. 
 Close friends 
 Parents 
 Siblings 
 Past or current employers 
 People under 18 
 Past or current teachers or GSIs 
24. What is your typical privacy setting for statuses?  
 Public 
 Friends only 
 Custom 
 Don’t know 
 
a. If Custom setting: Which of the following groups do you show your content. 
Check all that apply. 
 Close friends 
 Parents 
 Siblings 
 Past or current employers 
 People under 18 














How often do you engage in each of the following behaviors?  




 Never  
 
25. Untag photos of yourself that you feel are inappropriate?  
26. Refrain from positing a status or comment that you felt would be inappropriate?  
27. Delete comments a friend made on your wall because you thought it was inappropriate? 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
For each statement, chose one of the following answer choices: 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Don’t know 
 Somewhat agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
28. I see myself as sympathetic/warm 
29. I see myself as critical/quarrelsome 
30. I see myself as dependable/self-disciplined 
31. I see myself as disorganized/careless  
32. I see myself as calm/emotionally stable 
33. I see myself as anxious/easily upset  
34. I see myself as extraverted/enthusiastic 
35. I see myself as reserved/quiet  
36. I see myself as open to new experiences/complex 







How often do you do each of the following activities? 






38. Invite friends over to your house while your parents are home. 
39. Invite a past or current employer to a party.  
40. Invite a close friend, sibling, or other family member that is under 18 to a party. 
41. Sign up for the same discussion section with a close friend. 
 
 
How often do you engage in each of the following activities?  






42. Talk about drug use with my friends.  
43. Talk about excessive drinking with my friends.  
44. Talk about sexual experiences with my friends 
45. Wear somewhat revealing clothing when I go out to a party or bar with my friends. 
46. Criticize class or a teacher with my friends.  
47. Use swear words when I talk to my friends.  
How often do you engage in each of the following activities?  









48. Refrain from talking about excessive drinking in public. 
49. Use swear words in a public.  
50. Wear somewhat revealing clothing to work or a job interview.  
51. Refrain from talking about sexual experiences in public. 
52. Kiss someone in public.  
53. Talk to a friend about excessive drinking when I am in front of my parents.  
54. Refrain from talking about drug use in public. 
55. Refrain from criticizing a class or a teacher in public.  
 
How often do you engage in each of the following activities on Facebook?  






56. Use swear words in a comment or status. 
57. Talk about sexual experiences in a comment or status.  
58. Post or am tagged in photos wearing revealing clothing. 
a. If so, have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?  
 Yes 
 No 
59. Post or am tagged in photos holding red cups or bottles of beer, wine, or alcohol.  
a. If so, have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?  
 Yes 
 No 
60. Criticize a class, professor or a GSI in a comment or status. 
61. Criticize an employer or workplace in a negative way in a comment or status.  
62. Talk about excessive drinking in a comment or status.  




a. If so, have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?  
 Yes 
 No 
64. Post or am tagged in photos using drugs. 






























Appendix F: Complete Survey for Mechanical Turk Sample 
1. Please select your sex:  
 Male 
 Female 
2. How old are you?  ____ 
 
3. What is your level of education? 
 Currently in high school 
 Completed high school / GED 
 Currently enrolled at a 2 year college (Associates degree) 
 Currently enrolled at a 4 year college (BA,BS degree) 





 Completed a 2 year college degree (Associates) 
 Completed a 4 year college degree (BA,BS) 
 Currently pursuing Masters degree 
 Completed Masters degree 
 Currently  pursuing Doctoral degree 
 Completed Doctoral degree 
 Currently pursuing Professional degree (JD, MD) 
 Completed Professional degree (JD, MD) 
 
4. What is your race:  
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
 Asian 
 African American 
 White 
 Other  
5. What is your total household income? 














 More than $150,000 
 




7. How long have you had your Facebook account?  
 6 months 
 1 year 
 2 years 
 3 years 
 4 years 
 More than 4 years 
 
8. How often do you check your account? 
 Less than a few times per month,  
 A few times per month 
 A few times per week 
 Daily 
 More than 3 times per day 
 More than 5 times per day 
 
9. On average, how much time do you spend on Facebook each time you check your 
account?  
 Up to 5 minutes 
 15 minutes 
 30 minutes 
 1 hour 
 More than 1 hour 
 
10. About how many Facebook friends do you have? ____ 
11. How many of your Facebook friends would you consider to be close friends? _____ 
12. About how many friends do you hang out with or see on a regular basis? _____ 
13. Who would you accept as a friend?  
 Anybody 




 Friends of friends 
 People you I have met 
 Only very close friends and family 
 Only family 
14. How well do you have to know someone before you will accept them as a friend on 
Facebook?  
 Extremely well 
 Very well 
 Somewhat well 
 Not too well 
 Not well at all 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
 (Strongly agree, agree, don’t know, disagree, strongly disagree) 
 
 
14. I am unfamiliar with Facebook’s privacy settings.  
15. I feel comfortable using Facebook’s privacy settings.  
16. I am unsure of how protective my current privacy settings are.  
17. I was aware when Facebook updated its privacy controls in September of 2011.  
 
18. When do you last adjust your privacy settings? 
In the last month 
In the last 3 months 
In the last 6 months 
In the last year 
In the last two years 
In the last three or more years 
 
 
About how many of your Facebook friends fall into each one of these groups? 
19. Family members ______ 
20. Past or current employers _____ 
21. People under 18 ______ 
22. Past or current teachers  ______ 
23. What is your default privacy setting?  
 Public 




 Custom  
 Don’t know 
 
a. If Custom setting: Which of the following groups do you show your content. 
Check all that apply. 
 Close friends 
 Parents 
 Siblings 
 Past or current employers 
 People under 18 
 Past or current teachers  
 
24. What is your typical privacy setting for photos?  
 Public 
 Friends only 
 Custom 
 Don’t know 
 
a. If Custom setting: Which of the following groups do you show your content. 
Check all that apply. 
 Close friends 
 Parents 
 Siblings 
 Past or current employers 
 People under 18 
 Past or current teachers  
25. What is your typical privacy setting for statuses?  
 Public 
 Friends only 
 Custom 
 Don’t know 
 
a. If Custom setting: Which of the following groups do you show your content. 
Check all that apply. 
 Close friends 
 Parents 
 Siblings 
 Past or current employers 
 People under 18 







How often do you engage in each of the following behaviors?  




 Never  
 
26. Untag photos of yourself that you feel are inappropriate?  
27. Refrain from positing a status or comment that you felt would be inappropriate?  
28. Delete comments a friend made on your wall because you thought it was inappropriate? 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
For each statement, chose one of the following answer choices: 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree 
 Somewhat disagree 
 Don’t know 
 Somewhat agree 
 Agree 
 Strongly agree 
 
29. I see myself as sympathetic/warm 
30. I see myself as critical/quarrelsome 
31. I see myself as dependable/self-disciplined 
32. I see myself as disorganized/careless  
33. I see myself as calm/emotionally stable 
34. I see myself as anxious/easily upset  
35. I see myself as extraverted/enthusiastic 
36. I see myself as reserved/quiet  
37. I see myself as open to new experiences/complex 





How often do you do each of the following activities? 







39. Invite friends over while your kids (if you have children) or your parents are home. 
40. Invite a past or current employer to a party or bar.  
41. Invite someone who is under 18 to a party with your friends 
42. Sign up for a class or seminar with a close friend. 
How often do you engage in each of the following activities?  






43. Talk about drug use with my friends.  
44. Talk about excessive drinking with my friends.  
45. Talk about sexual experiences with my friends 
46. Wear somewhat revealing clothing when I go out to a party or bar with my friends. 
47. Criticize class or a teacher with my friends.  
48. Use swear words when I talk to my friends.  
How often do you engage in each of the following activities?  






49. Refrain from talking about excessive drinking in public. 




51. Wear somewhat revealing clothing to work or a job interview. (R) 
52. Refrain from talking about sexual experiences in public. 
53. Kiss someone in public. (R) 
54. Talk on the phone about excessive drinking when I am in front of my parents. (R) 
55. Refrain from criticizing an employer or workplace in public. 
56. Refrain from talking about drug use in public.  
57. Refrain from criticizing a teacher or class in public.  
How often do you engage in each of the following activities on Facebook?  







58. Use swear words in a comment or status. 
59. Talk about sexual experiences in a comment or status.  
60. Post or am tagged in photos wearing revealing clothing. 
a. If so, have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?  
 Yes 
 No 
61. Post or am tagged in photos holding red cups or bottles of beer, wine, or alcohol.  
a. If so, have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?  
 Yes 
 No 
62. Criticize a class or teacher in a comment or status. 
63. Criticize an employer or workplace in a comment or status.  
64. Talk about excessive drinking in a comment or status.  
65. Post or am tagged in photos where I am kissing someone.  
a. If so, have you ever made one of these photos a profile picture?  
 Yes 
 No 
66. Post or am tagged in photos using drugs. 















Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
ImageManagement1 Equal variances 
assumed 











 Age N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ImageManagement1 NetGeners 155 .5871 .19911 .01599 






















 Age N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
FriendSelectivity1 Net Geners 154 .5252 .14941 .01204 
Baby 
Boomers 
115 .6001 .18264 .01703 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
FriendAcceptance1 Equal variances 
assumed 








Appendix I: An Independent Samples T-Test Comparing the Privacy Controls of Net Geners and Baby Boomers 
 
Group Statistics 
 Age N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
PrivacyControl1 NetGeners 149 .6801 .19067 .01562 
BabyBoomers 104 .6795 .19786 .01940 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
PrivacyControl1 Equal variances 
assumed 














Appendix J: An Independent Samples T-Test Comparing the Privacy Controls Knowledge of Net Geners and Baby Boomers 
 
Group Statistics 
 Age N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
PrivacyKnowledge NetGeners 155 .7520 .16613 .01334 
Baby 
Boomers 
116 .6998 .19072 .01771 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
PrivacyKnowledge Equal variances assumed 1.161 .282 2.402 269 .017 .05220 .02174 .00941 .09500 









Appendix K: A Paired Samples T-Test Comparing Offline Privacy Protection and Facebook Privacy Controls 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 OfflinePrivacy1 .7728 345 .13165 .00709 




Paired Samples Correlations 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 OfflinePrivacy1 & 
PrivacyControl1 
345 .188 .000 
 
 





tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 OfflinePrivacy1 - 
PrivacyControl1 








Appendix L: An Independent Samples T-Test Comparing the Offline Privacy Protection of Net Geners and Baby Boomers 
 
Group Statistics 
 Age N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
OfflinePrivacy1 NetGeners 151 .7437 .12185 .00992 
BabyBoomers 110 .8343 .12564 .01198 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
OfflinePrivacy1 Equal variances 
assumed 




-5.826 230.806 .000 -.09060 .01555 -.12124 -.05996 
 
 
 
 
 
